Legal processes and the service conception of authority by Lawless, John
 Legal Processes and the Service Conception of Authority 
 
John Lawless 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of 
Philosophy. 
 
Chapel Hill 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Gerald Postema 
 
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord 
 
Thomas Hill 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 
John Lawless 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
 
 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
JOHN LAWLESS: Legal Processes and the Service Conception of Authority 
(Under the direction of Gerald Postema) 
 
On Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority, one agent is normally justified in 
regarding another’s directives as authoritative when and only when in doing so the former is 
likely to act in better conformity with the reasons holding for him than he would were he to 
attempt to work out independently what he has reason to do. I argue that the service conception 
imposes requirements on the kinds of processes of which authoritative directives can be the 
output: they must be open to and appropriately responsive to evidence about the reasons 
holding for subjects. I then argue for two theses about law: that law’s content is influenced by 
(changing) evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects, and that requirements that legal 
officials be open to and appropriately responsive to evidence about the reasons holding for legal 
subjects are expressions of law’s claim to authority and Rule of Law requirements. 
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I. Introduction 
Practical reasoning serves a purpose. By reflecting on our desires and principles and by 
investigating the world, we acquire evidence about the ways in which we should act; and by 
running this evidence through appropriate (rational) transformations, we arrive at practical 
conclusions. When all goes well (when the evidence is complete and does not mislead, and when 
our practical rational processes are not subject to familiar distortions like bias and passion) we 
act in conformity with the reasons holding for us: we satisfy our desires in ways that reflect the 
principles to which we commit. (To be sure, this is only a rough sketch.) According to Joseph 
Raz, practical authority serves the same purpose. To regard another agent as an authority is to 
outsource one’s practical reasoning to her and to substitute her practical conclusions for one’s 
own. Making these substitutions can provide a valuable service: if the other has a better view on 
things, or is in general better at practical reasoning with respect to the matter at hand, or is less 
distracted by bias or passion, then by outsourcing my practical reasoning to her I will better 
comply with the reasons holding for myself than I would do by acting on my own practical 
conclusions. 
This service conception of authority has played an important role in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence in the past several decades. But theorists have paid inadequate attention to the 
constraints that the service conception imposes on the processes by which practical authorities 
arrive at the instructions they offer their subjects. In this paper, I will argue that, unless directives 
are the output of processes that seek out evidence about the reasons holding for subjects and 
that reliably produce instructions that (the evidence suggests) will help subjects act in conformity 
with the reasons holding for them, they cannot be legitimately authoritative (in Raz’s sense). 
 
 
 2 
Focusing on these authoritative processes (and not just the directives that authorities issue) can 
help us to understand a number of important features of law. It can help us to clarify our 
conception of courts, and to see them as institutions apt for the provision of the Razian service 
(and not merely as appliers of the law). It can help us to see an important connection between 
what law is and what law ought to be that manifests itself in the ways in which courtroom officials 
are required to be open to evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects, and to interpret 
law in ways that are appropriately responsive to that evidence. And it can provide us with a 
connection between the concept of law and the Rule of Law: law’s claim to provide for legal 
subjects the Razian service expresses itself through requirements that legal officials remain open 
to and appropriately responsive to evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects, thereby 
curbing opportunities for arbitrary exercises of power. 
In this paper, I will (Section II) articulate the fundamentals of Raz’s service conception 
of authority and (Section III) defend it against some pertinent criticisms, before (Section IV) 
articulating and arguing for an emphasis on legitimate authoritative processes. I will then 
(Section V) identify some of the procedural requirements that legitimate authorities must satisfy 
in order to acquire the kinds of evidence to which they must be responsive before finally 
(Section VI) deriving from these points several lessons about law and the Rule of Law. 
II. The Service Conception of Authority 
(1) Two Ideas in the Background 
First, we need a brief sketch of what it might mean to act in conformity with reason. 
Two points are particularly relevant: (a) the distinctive roles of facts and beliefs in the guidance 
and assessment of actions, and (b) the distinction between first- and second-order reasons. This 
provides the resources to which I’ll need access in my discussion of the service conception of 
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authority, but serves mainly as background. So while these points will be useful, my presentation 
of them will be brief. 
(a) Facts, beliefs, and reasons. Say that Elena desires to purchase the most fuel-efficient car 
available in her region, and that the Nissan Leaf is the most fuel-efficient car available in her 
region. Purchasing a Leaf would count as purchasing the most fuel-efficient car in her region, so 
Elena has a reason to make the purchase—even if she does not believe that the Leaf is the most 
fuel-efficient car available in her region (and so does not believe that purchasing a Leaf counts as 
purchasing the most fuel-efficient car available in the region). Moreover, even if Elena 
mistakenly believes that a Cadillac Wagon is the most fuel-efficient car in the region, then 
though she takes herself to have a reason to purchase a Cadillac, she is mistaken (and even has a 
positive reason to not do so). In this example, the facts of the matter—not Elena’s beliefs—
determine the reasons holding for Elena; her beliefs merely serve to represent (often 
imperfectly) facts to her so that they are fit to feature in her practical reason. 
Now say that Elena, still in the grips of her false belief, purchases a Cadillac Wagon. 
When asked why she did so, she will first identify what she took to be her reason for doing so, 
namely, that it was the most fuel-efficient car available in her region. But when she later 
discovers (to her dismay) that it is, in fact, wildly inefficient, her story will change: she will say 
that she believed that it was the most fuel-efficient car available in her region. How ought we 
interpret this shift in Elena’s story? Two possibilities readily present themselves. First, we might 
think that Elena’s belief was her reason for acting. But typically we cite facts as reasons when we 
speak normatively about what we ought to have done, what we did right, what we have reason to 
do. We cite beliefs as reasons when we speak explanatorily, when we reflect on the reasons that an 
agent took herself to have in order to understand why she did what she did, or on what an agent 
is likely to do when we try to predict her future actions. When things go wrong, agents cite their 
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defective beliefs as reasons for action in order to explain how they went wrong, their correct 
beliefs when they explain how things went right. If this feature of our discourse is telling, then it 
suggests a second interpretation of Elena’s second report: the agent who reports that the belief 
was her reason for acting merely signals that she believed she had a reason for acting.1 When she 
cites as her reason for purchasing the Cadillac her belief that it was fuel-efficient, what she is 
really doing is citing her belief that she had a reason to buy the car. 
This line of thought captures the general Razian conception of the relationship between 
facts, beliefs, and reasons: the agent’s beliefs—which, as mental states, are fit to guide the agent’s 
action by featuring in her practical reasoning—serve to represent to her the reasons holding for 
her (at least, when things go well), but they are not themselves the reasons holding for her.2 
When things do go well, agents discover the reasons holding for them through their true beliefs 
about their circumstances; when things go badly (say, because the evidence about the reasons 
holding for them is misleading or incomplete) agents act on false beliefs about the reasons 
holding for them. Of course, if Elena believes that the Cadillac is the most fuel-efficient car 
available, there is a sense in which she would be acting irrationally were she to purchase the Leaf, 
even though she has reason to buy the Leaf (and not the Cadillac). But this is only because our 
beliefs are often the our best guide to the reasons holding to us. The service conception of 
authority will provide us with an idea of the ways in which other agents might serve as better 
guides for us. 
(b) First- and second-order reasons. Now take three facts, the fact that P, the fact that Q, and 
the fact that R. Say that the fact that P counts as a reason for Elena to φ in circumstances C; that 
                                                 
1 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (London: Hutchinson, 1975), 18. 
 
2 Raz, Practical Reason, 17. 
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is, the fact that P is a “first-order reason” for Elena to φ in C. Raz characterizes two ways in which 
other reasons might tell against Elena’s φ-ing in C for the reason that P.3 
First, strong reasons beat out weak reasons (roughly put). Take Elena again. She values 
fuel-efficiency, but she also values affordability. The Nissan Leaf (while wildly fuel-efficient) is 
also quite costly, and though Elena desires the most fuel-efficient car available in her region, it 
will cost her far more in the short term to purchase a Leaf than it would cost her to purchase, 
say, a Ford Fiesta. Elena’s reason to refrain from purchasing a Leaf (the fact that the Leaf is not 
affordable) may outweigh the reason she has to purchase a Leaf (the fact that it is the most fuel-
efficient option). 
Generally, if the fact that P counts as a reason for an agent to φ in C and the fact that Q 
counts as a reason for Elena to not-φ in C, and if the fact that Q is a “stronger” reason for Elena 
than is the fact that P, then (abstracting from any other possible considerations) it would be on 
balance contrary to reason for Elena to φ in C. Talk of one reason “outweighing” another, or of 
reasons being “strong” or “weak,” is of course a bit metaphorical, but the idea should be 
intuitive enough: one can think of the comparative strength of two reasons as akin to the 
comparative cost of failing to act in conformity with either reason.4 This is why it will be in 
conformity with the balance of the reasons holding for Elena to purchase a Fiesta rather than a 
Leaf: to purchase a Leaf in spite of her reason to purchase an affordable car would be far more 
“costly” than it would be to purchase a Fiesta in spite of her reason to purchase the most fuel-
efficient car in her region. Here, practical reasoning is essentially a matter of accounting. 
                                                 
3 The following discussion is based on Raz, Practical Reason, 39-40. 
 
4 I should emphasize that by invoking the notion of cost, I don’t mean to suggest that reasons are 
necessarily based in self-interest. I don’t offer a precise account of the way in which stronger 
reasons defeat weaker reasons, I only mean to suggest the general idea. 
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Second, some reasons might tell against allowing certain considerations to play a role in 
one’s practical reasoning at all. This is not a matter of one reason defeating another; it is a matter 
of one reason excluding another. For example, if Elena and Ted are married, then the fact that 
their anniversary is coming up may count as a reason for Ted to buy Elena a nice shirt; and the 
fact that, were he to fail to give Elena a shirt, she would be less likely to give him anniversary 
presents in the future, may also count as a reason for Ted to buy Elena a nice shirt. But given 
the dynamics of a healthy marriage, it might also be that Ted has a reason not to give Elena a nice 
shirt for the latter reason. He might well still act in conformity with this latter reason (in Raz’s 
terms), but he shouldn’t act for it. He ought to give Elena a nice shirt for the reason that doing so 
will express his love for her, but for him to do so for the reason that doing so would secure the 
influx of future gifts would display an unfortunate fault line in his relationship with Elena.  
Raz argues that this sort of phenomenon underlies the reasons-giving nature of practical 
authoritative instructions. I will present that argument in the next section, but first the general 
point: say that the fact that P counts as a reason to φ in C, and the fact that R counts as a reason not 
to φ in C for the reason that P. The fact that R is not a reason to not-φ in C, only a reason not to 
take the fact that P as a reason for φ-ing in C. The fact that P is a first-order reason that can tell 
against (and be told against by) other first-order reasons. The fact that R is a second-order reason 
that excludes another reason (or multiple other reasons) from practical reasoning; it is a reason 
not to act for the reason that P. Other first-order reasons might tell in favor of φ-ing in C, and 
further second-order reasons might tell in favor of taking the fact that P as a reason to φ in C, or 
even against taking the fact that R as a reason not to φ for the reason that P. Practical reasoning 
becomes a matter, first, of excluding from one’s practical reasoning those reasons excluded by 
the balance of second-order reasons; and second, of balancing those first-order reasons that 
remain. 
 
 
 7 
This is not to say there are not other roles that reasons might play in our practical 
reasoning, but I will not be concerned with the possibility here. With this background in place, 
we are now in a position to develop Raz’s service conception authority. 
(2) The Service Conception of Authority 
The service conception of authority provides an account of (a) the role that directives 
play in agents’ practical reasoning when they regard them as authoritative, and (b) the conditions 
in which their playing that role is justified. (I should mention that this is not enough to get an 
account of the meaning of claims of the form “Agent A has authority over another agent S” off 
the ground.5 I’ll turn to this point in Section III.) 
For context, it will be useful to set out two cases in which an agent’s instructions might 
justifiably play an authoritative role in another agent’s practical reasoning. First, one agent might 
regard another as an authority because the latter has expertise with respect to a relevant subject 
matter. Doctors, for example, are taken to have access to more information about human bodily 
health than most patients, so medical laypersons typically regard doctors as authorities on 
matters related to health.6 Second, multiple agents might regard another as an authority because 
doing so allows them to coordinate their activities in a way that renders possible action in 
conformity with the reasons holding for them. Say that a group of people is playing on a football 
team. There might well exist a number of plays with which the team might move the ball down 
the field, but unless there is a reason to converge on one of them, the members of the team will 
not be able to execute any of them; it will be better for them if they regard one person’s 
                                                 
5 Raz is fully aware of this: “My proposed account of authority is not even an account of the 
meaning of the phrase ‘X has authority over Y’. It is an account of legitimate authority, whereas 
the phrase is often used to refer to de facto authorities.” The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), 65. 
 
6 For now, I ask that the reader set aside concerns that the doctor’s prescriptions are not 
practically authoritative instructions, but merely an experts’ advice; I’ll say something about this 
concern in just a moment (Section III.3). 
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instructions (say, the quarterback’s or the coach’s) as authoritative so that when the ball is 
snapped, there won’t be a counterproductive chaos on the field. Whoever calls the play need not 
possess the best football mind around—he need not be an expert with respect to the domain 
within which he has authority, as the doctor is. But he will at least be capable of identifying the 
sorts of plays that are likely to be successful. He does not solve the coordination problem simply 
by rendering one of its solutions salient, but by identifying a solution. 
We are interested in two questions: (i) what is it for the medical layperson to regard the 
doctor as a medical authority, or for the linebacker to regard the coach as an authority? How do 
we characterize the relationship between subjects and authorities, and how do practically 
authoritative instructions give subjects reasons for action? And (ii) what justifies their doing so in 
these cases? 
(a) The analysis. Through practical reasoning, agents attempt to act in conformity with the 
reasons holding for them. They acquire evidence about those reasons, put the evidence through 
a series of rational transformations, and at the end come up with a practical conclusion that is 
successful to the degree that it conforms with these reasons. But in a variety of situations, the 
cards are stacked against the agent: the evidence available to the agent is misleading or 
incomplete, the agent’s practical rational processes are distorted by bias or passion, or the 
complexities of interactions with others and the uncertainties that such interactions engender 
block action in conformity with the reasons holding for her. In these circumstances, an agent’s 
practical rational processes will not serve their purpose. But someone else’s might. If another 
agent has a better view of the evidence, is free of those biases and passions that undermine 
practical reason, or has the capacity to coordinate agents’ actions in a way that renders possible 
action in conformity with the reasons holding for them, then by outsourcing her practical 
reasoning to the better situated agent, the former agent will be better able to act in conformity 
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with the reasons holding for her. So when the latter agent says, “You should φ,” the former 
agent will do well to substitute this instruction for her own practical conclusion. If she has 
reason to believe that this is the case, then she will be justified in substituting the instruction for 
the conclusion she would reach were she to attempt to work out independently what she has 
reason to do in the matter at hand. This is the basic shape of the service conception of authority. 
Now let’s look to its details. 
(i) An agent substitutes another’s instruction to φ for her own practical conclusions by 
regarding those instructions as protected reasons—that is, as a first-order reason to φ that is 
protected from defeat by a second-order reason excluding certain other first-order reasons. For 
example, when Doctor Penrose instructs Elena to take Zanotab twice daily, Elena regards the 
instruction as a reason to take the pill, and takes that reason to be protected from defeat by 
certain other considerations.7 
(ii) Raz argues that in paradigmatic cases a subject will be justified in regarding another’s 
instructions as protected reasons if doing so helps her to act in better conformity with the 
reasons holding for her than she would otherwise have done. For the sake of parsimony, I’d like 
to introduce some new terminology. Call the actions that S would perform were S to act on his 
own practical conclusions (the conclusions to which S would come were he to attempt to work 
out independently what he has reason to do in the matter at hand) S’s independent acts. Call the 
acts that S would perform were S to act on A’s instructions S’s instructed acts; these are the 
conclusions of A’s practical reasoning when A reasons about what S ought to do, and they are 
the instructions that A issues to S. We are interested in three relations: those holding between 
R1 (a) S’s independent acts and (b) the reasons S has for acting, 
                                                 
7 Which reasons are excluded will depend on the scope of A’s authority; I’ll touch on this point in 
a moment (p. 15). 
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R2 (a) S’s instructed acts and (b) the reasons S has for acting, and 
R3 (a) relationship R2 and (b) relationship R3. 
R3 involves some kind of comparison between, on the one hand, how the agent would do by 
the reasons holding for him were he to act on his own practical conclusions, and, on the other 
hand, how the agent would do by the reasons holding for him were he to follow the authority’s 
instructions. On the service conception of authority, it is this comparison in which we are 
interested. As Raz puts the point:  
…the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves 
showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to 
him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the 
alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying 
to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.8 
 
This is Raz’s normal justification thesis (NJT).9 Generally, the idea is that for any two agents A and 
S, S will be justified in the normal way in regarding A’s instructions as authoritative only if:10 
C1 S’s instructed acts would likely conform better with the reasons holding for S than would 
S’s independent acts. 
What are we to make of the qualifier “likely” in C1? I suggest that, when one agent A’s 
instructions are legitimately authoritative for S, S’s instructed acts are more likely to conform 
with the reasons holding for S than are S’s independent acts in the sense that S should have a 
higher credence that his instructed acts will conform with the reasons holding for him than that 
his independent acts will. In Section IV, I’ll be concerned to show what justifies this higher 
                                                 
8 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 53. 
 
9 I’ll say in a moment what it means to call this justification “normal” (p. 11). 
 
10 I should point out that I present this as a necessary, but insufficient, condition. Over the next 
few sections, I will show what more is needed, and will give a complete condition in Section 
IV.4. 
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credence in paradigmatic cases. But first I want to show how C1 works to justify S’s taking A’s 
instructions as protected reasons, and to make a few caveats. 
(b) Paradigm cases. It’s easy enough to see how to apply this framework to the two 
paradigm cases considered above. Doctor Penrose has access to more information about human 
health than does Elena (a medical layperson) and is more experienced with the types of 
reasoning associated with medical science, so Elena will be justified in taking Penrose’s 
prescription as a protected reason to take Zanotab twice daily. In doing so, she is more likely to 
act in conformity with the (health-related) reasons applying to her than she would be were she to 
act on her own practical conclusions. Were Elena to insist on acting on her own practical 
conclusions rather than on Penrose’s prescriptions, she would actually undermine her changes of 
acting in conformity with the reasons holding for her. And the coach’s instructions help the 
members of the football team coordinate their activities in a way that renders possible the 
movement of the ball down the field. The members of the team have a common goal (winning), 
and the fact that divergent strategies α, β, and γ all constitute potential winning strategies gives 
them a reason to execute strategy α, a reason to execute strategy β, and a reason to execute 
strategy γ; but unless they are able to converge on one of these strategies, they will not be able to 
execute any of them. They will be unable to act in conformity with the reasons applying to them. 
But by treating the coach’s instructions as authoritative, they are able to able to do so. They can 
converge on, say, strategy α, which (if executed properly) will enable them to move the ball 
down the field and score a touchdown. 
(c) “Abnormal” cases. These are two paradigmatic cases in which agents are justified in “the 
normal way” in taking another agent’s instructions as protected reasons. Raz offers two cases in 
which he claims that authority is (as it were) “abnormally” justified. In the first case, (i) one agent 
claims authority (that is, he claims to provide the Razian service) and (ii) considerations tell in 
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favor of acting as though the claim is true, even if one has no reason to believe that it is (or even 
positive reason to doubt it). In the second, (i) multiple agents regard one agent’s instructions as 
authoritative, and (ii) considerations tell in favor of acting as though they are right, even if one 
has no reason to believe that they are (or even positive reason to doubt it). Let me cite Raz’s 
examples before making some comments. 
First,11 take Alex—a sweet but foolish man who thinks he is much smarter than he is, 
and continually offers his friend Ted advice. Ted might regard Alex’s instruction to φ as a 
protected reason to φ, not because he is likely to do better by the reasons holding for him than 
he would were he to attempt to act directly on those reasons, but merely because Ted does not 
want to hurt Alex’s feelings. If this is all that justifies Ted in regarding Alex’s instructions as 
protected reasons, then Ted may have a perfectly good reason for taking Alex’s instructions as 
authoritative, but it is not the “normal” one identified above. It is in some sense parasitic on the 
“normal” justification, because (in claiming authority) Alex claims to perform the Razian service 
for Ted. He certainly does not intend that Ted take his instructions as protected reasons for the 
reason that, in doing so, Ted will not hurt Alex’s feelings; he intends that Ted take his 
instructions as protected reasons for the reason that his instructions are sound. In that sense, 
Ted’s justification for taking Alex’s advice as a protected reason is parasitic on, but distinct from, 
the “normal” justification. 
Second,12 if Shelley is the leader of a group, and most members of the group take her 
instructions as authoritative (or at least seem to do so), then other members of the group might 
                                                 
11 This example is due to Raz, Morality of Freedom, 53-54. 
 
12 This example is due to Raz, Morality of Freedom, 54-55. 
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take her instructions as protected reasons simply because doing so is an important way in which 
one identifies with that group. 
It seems more appropriate to describe these as cases of justified deference, not as cases in 
which agents are abnormally justified in regarding another’s instructions as authoritative. 
Perhaps Raz thinks that the two are identical. In any case, there has been some pushback 
recently against the thesis that C1 identifies the normal justification; theorists like Scott 
Hershovitz and Scott Shapiro have argued that there are reasons to take an agent’s instructions 
as authoritative that are not in any way parasitic on the normal justification. I’ll say more about 
their critique in the next sub-section (II.3). First we should clear up six details about this service 
conception of authority. 
(d) Six caveats. First, I should remind the reader that the NJT is not yet an analysis of the 
meaning of statements of the form “A has authority over S.”13 It is an analysis of (a) the roles 
played by authoritative directives in agents’ practical reasoning and (b) the normal justification 
for their playing this role. One natural suggestion for an analysis of authoritative roles that hooks 
up neatly with the NJT—that A has authority over S if and only if S would be justified in the 
normal way in taking A’s instructions as protected reasons—will not do the trick; we’ll see 
arguments to this effect in Section III.1, and I’ll argue for an alternative analysis in Section III.3.  
Second, there might be circumstances in which or matters on which it is more important 
that agents choose for themselves than that they choose rightly. Raz suggests that, if we are not 
given the space within which to choose for ourselves at times, our own practical rational 
processes may atrophy, and we may become utterly dependent on the advice of practical 
authorities. If we have reason to remain self-reliant, we will have to exercise our practical rational 
capacities now and again, and so will need some space within which to choose for ourselves. 
                                                 
13 See n. 5. 
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Again, there might be acts (like marriage in contemporary Western cultures) with felicity 
conditions that cannot be satisfied unless the agent herself performs the action, without the 
intervention of another agent nor on the instructions of a superior.14 And surely there are 
psychological benefits to feeling that one is more or less in control of one’s life and responsible 
for its development. So in the complete condition on legitimate authority below (Section IV.4), 
we will include what Gerald Postema calls the “autonomy proviso,”15 limiting the circumstances 
in which one agent can have legitimate authority over another to those in which it is more 
important that the latter agent act in conformity with the reasons holding for her than it is that 
she choose for herself. 
Third, one agent can be responsive to another’s advice without regarding her 
instructions as protected reasons. At times an agent will be justified in regarding another’s claim 
“You should φ,” not as creating a reason for her to φ, but merely as identifying reasons that 
already exist. The instructor gives the instructed a reason to believe that she has reason to φ. We can 
distinguish expert advice from practical authority, then, by identifying the distinct roles played by 
each in our practical reasoning. 
Fourth, a subject S need not regard the instruction to φ as a reason not to deliberate about 
the reasons for and against φ-ing; as long as such deliberation takes place “offline” (that is, 
without immediate consequences in S’s actions), S will still regard authority A’s instructions as 
authoritative. This distinguishes the Razian account of authority from the Hobbesian account, in 
                                                 
14 Raz, “The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception,” in Minnesota Law Review 
90 (2005-2006): 1015-16. 
 
15 Gerald Postema Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Common Law World (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2011), 364. 
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which the sovereign defines right and wrong action for her subjects.16 Nor does the authoritative 
instruction sap the reasons holding for the subject ab initio of their normative force; it is only 
because these reasons still have normative force that action in conformity with them is valuable 
for the subject, and so only because these reasons remain in force that the subject has reason to 
act on the authoritative instruction. The exclusionary reasons associated with authoritative 
instructions do not eliminate reasons, but only give the subject reason not to act for them. 
Fifth, the scope of an agent’s authority may be limited to a particular subject matter. 
Doctor Penrose’s authority is limited to issues related to human health. So when Penrose directs 
Elena to take Zanotab twice daily, Penrose’s instructions cannot protect Elena’s reason to take 
the pills from defeat by considerations unrelated to health. Say that the pharmaceutical company 
responsible for the production of the prescribed pill is known to test its medication on animals, 
and Elena is profoundly opposed to animal testing. She may have a reason to take a principled 
stand against the pharmaceutical corporation that is not excluded by the fact of Penrose’s 
expertise. Practical rationality here will consist in balancing Elena’s reason to treat her malady 
against her un-excluded reason to boycott the pharmaceutical corporation in question, and the 
doctor does not stand in a position to do this for her. 
Sixth, even if A is mistaken about how S ought to act in a particular case, S may still be 
justified in regarding A’s instructions as authoritative.17 Recall the relationship between beliefs 
and reasons described in Section II.1: our beliefs are often our best guide to the reasons holding 
for us, and since we have to make do with what we’ve got, we must act on our beliefs even when 
they are mistaken—unless better guides are available. Practical authorities—like our own 
                                                 
16 “[I]t was necessary there should be a common measure of all things that might fall in 
controversy; as for example: of what is to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, 
what little, what meum and tuum, what a pound, what a quart, &c.” Thomas Hobbes, Elements of 
Law, ed. Ferdinaned Tönnies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), 150. 
 
17 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 47. 
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beliefs—may be mistaken, but when they are available they are our best guides to the reasons 
holding for us, and so we are justified in regarding their instructions as protected reasons even 
when they are mistaken. So if Doctor Penrose tells his patient Alma that she ought to take 
Zanotab twice daily, but his prescription is mistaken, Alma will still be justified in taking the 
prescription as a protected reason to take Zanotab twice daily. This is because, by substituting 
Penrose’s instruction for her own practical conclusion, she is still likely to do better than she 
would were she to act on her own practical conclusions. C1 only requires that subjects be likely 
to better act in conformity with the reasons applying to him should he substitute A’s instructions 
for his own practical conclusions, which is consistent with occasional mistakes on A’s part. 
What about cases in which, from the subject’s perspective, A’s instructions are clearly 
mistaken? Take a case from Raz: 
I am driving my car in flat country with perfect visibility and there is no other human 
being, animal, or car for miles around me. I come to a traffic light showing red. Do I 
have any reason to stop? There is no danger to anyone and whatever I do will not be 
known to anyone and will not affect my own attitude, feelings, or beliefs about authority 
in the future. Many will say that there is not even the slightest reason to stop at the red 
light in such circumstances.18 
 
There is a superficial response: if legal subjects are free to determine for themselves whether or 
not the legal directive to stop at red lights applies to the case at hand, then law’s authority itself 
will be undermined. But the fact that φ-ing will undermine an authority’s capacity to coordinate 
constitutes a reason to not-φ, if one has reason to support the coordination. So if it is true that 
running the red light in the case at hand will undermine law’s capacity to coordinate traffic, then 
the driver does have a reason to refrain from running the red light. Presumably, it is for precisely 
this reason that Raz stipulates that no one will ever know we have run the red light, that it will 
not affect the driver’s attitudes, feelings, or beliefs about the authority of the law. If these 
                                                 
18 Raz, “Legitimate Authority,” in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 16. 
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stipulations don’t show that our running the red light won’t undermine law’s authority, then the 
case will no longer be one in which the driver has no reason to refrain from running the red 
light—but it is a reason that holds for the driver prior to the issue of the authoritative 
instruction, namely, the reason to support the coordination of motor traffic so that she may 
safely and efficiently travel by automobile. But where running the red light will not undermine 
the state’s efforts to coordinate motor traffic there seems to be no reason at all for the driver to 
stop. 
(3) Communitarian Justifications of Authority 
I mentioned a moment ago that Hershovitz19 has criticized the NJT on the grounds that, 
in calling the “normal” justification normal, Raz ignores other important ways in which practical 
authority is justified. In particular, Hershovitz concedes that while a part of any democratic 
government’s authority surely derives from its provision of the Razian service to legal subjects, 
but argues that this is not the main source of its legitimacy.20 Robustly democratic governments 
might well be authoritative because their decisions represent the decisions of the community they 
rule. They may arrive at decisions that are (to some degree) substantively incorrect, and so may 
fail to provide the Razian service for legal subjects; but because their decisions are the products 
of processes that respect subjects’ dignity and autonomy by involving them in fair, public 
deliberation, the government’s decisions in an important sense belong to the members of the 
community. The autonomy proviso is at work here: just as it is sometimes more important that 
we choose for ourselves than that we choose rightly, so (the proceduralist argues) it is sometimes 
                                                 
19 Hershovitz develops the critique primarily in number of articles, including “Legitimacy, 
Democracy, and Razian Authority,” Legal Theory 9 (2003): 201-221. Shapiro offers a similar 
critique in “Authority,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, ed. Jules 
Coleman et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 431-439. 
 
20 Hershovitz, “Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority,” 213-219. 
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and to some extent more important that the community decide for itself than that its decisions be 
right. 
Hershovitz has argued for this conception of authority by pointing out that we 
sometimes take de facto authorities to be illegitimate on procedural grounds, and by arguing that 
the service conception of authority cannot capture this phenomenon. Here’s Hershovitz: 
Our discourse about the legitimacy of governments indicates that we believe a 
government can fail to be legitimate on procedural grounds. If a government’s electoral 
system favors some interests in society, or appears corruptly financed, or causes portions 
of the population to be marginalized and voiceless, we are quick to judge it illegitimate, 
or at least less legitimate than it might be otherwise. Where these deficiencies are present, 
it counts for little that a government may produce substantively good decisions, 
decisions that the normal justification thesis would hold authoritative.21 
 
Hershovitz has taken this fact of our discourse as evidence that the authority of the government 
in question is not based solely on its provision of the Razian service: 
They fail to be legitimate because, even though they produce good law, they do it 
without showing proper respect toward their citizens, without allowing them appropriate 
opportunity to participate in the structuring of their own lives, without regard for a just 
allocation of political power, and perhaps in ways that breed resentment and alienation.22 
 
If we cannot make sense of our concerns about procedurally incorrect governments with the 
tools afforded us by the NJT, then we will have reason to reject Raz’s claim that the thesis 
identifies authority’s normal justification; this fact of our discourse about democratic authority 
counts as evidence in favor of the sort of Hershovitz’s communitarian conception of authority, 
which places procedural considerations front and center. 
One way of responding to the point—one that seems to have tempted Raz23—is simply 
to point out that if an agent has reason to take as authoritative decisions reached by a certain 
                                                 
21 Hershovitz, “Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority,” 216. 
 
22 Hershovitz, “Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority” 217. 
 
23 See Raz, “The Problem of Authority,” 1030. 
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kind of process, then there is a trivial sense in which that agent will act in better conformity with 
the reasons holding for her if she takes those decisions as authoritative than she would were she 
to act on her own practical conclusions. She will, after all, act in conformity with the reason she 
has to take as authoritative the instructions produced by procedurally correct decision-making 
processes. Take a familiar case: Alonso might have reason to do as his mother tells him (because, 
in doing so, he’ll express his love for her); and Alonso will act in conformity with this reason 
when he substitutes his mother’s instruction for his own practical conclusions. So (one might 
think) Alonso will be justified in the normal way taking his mother’s instructions as protected 
reasons. Similarly, the members of a community might have a reason to do as their community 
(given voice by democratic institutions) instructs. So, when their community reaches a decision, 
they will act in conformity with that reason when they substitute their community’s instruction 
for their own practical conclusion. The members of the community will be justified in the 
normal way in taking their community’s instructions as protected reasons. 
But Hershovitz rightly notes that this sort of a move would be disastrous for the service 
conception because it would rob the NJT of any content, boiling it down to the uninteresting 
claim that agents have reason to do what they have reason to do:24 “So conceived, the normal 
justification thesis would accommodate all theories of legitimacy that turned out to be true; 
hence it ceases to be a competitor with other candidate theories of legitimacy.”25 I find this point 
persuasive, and so am inclined to think that it would be imprudent to dismiss out of hand the 
idea that there might be some matters on which it is better that the community decide for itself 
than that the community get it right; and that, with respect to such matters, democratic 
procedures respecting community members’ dignity and autonomy might be the appropriate 
                                                 
24 Cf. Hershovitz, “The Role of Authority,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 11 (2011): 5. 
 
25 Hershovitz, “Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority,” 219. 
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manner in which such decisions are to be made. Of course (as Hershovitz recognizes), this 
would not show that the Razian normal justification is not an important way in which agents are 
justified in taking another’s instructions as protected reasons; it only shows that it is not really as 
normal as Raz has claimed. 
I raise this point here in part because I will argue (in Section V) on Razian grounds (laid 
out in Section IV) that legitimately authoritative instructions must derive from processes that to 
some extent overlap those that are associated with authority justified in the way Hershovitz 
suggests. In particular, I will argue that legitimate practical authorities must consult with subjects, 
foster and pay attention to normative discourse (much of which should involve subjects), and 
must make public the evidence on which their decisions have been based (so as to make it 
available for critique, plausibly by legal subjects). If this is right, then the mere fact that some 
practically authoritative roles and institutions (like democratic government) involve processual 
elements would not necessarily show that their authority is justified on the communitarian 
grounds that Hershovitz identifies. 
If we’re to think that this project is viable, we’ll have to address two concerns. First, do 
authoritative decision-making processes that involve subjects stand in tension with the spirit of 
the service conception of authority, on which subjects outsource their practical reasoning to 
another? And second, when these processes are associated with a practically authoritative role or 
institution, is there any principled way to determine whether this counts as evidence that the role 
is justified on communitarian grounds, or on Razian grounds? 
I will say that the answers (respectively) will be “No” and “Yes.” But before showing 
why I’d like first to motivate the claim that we should associate these processes with providers of 
the Razian service. That will take up the bulk of Sections IV and V; in Section V.4, I’ll return to 
these two concerns. In the meantime, in order to maintain continuity with the literature, I’ll 
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continue to describe the Razian normal justification as it’s been described (that is, as normal), 
though in doing so I don’t mean to downplay Hershovitz’s point. 
III. “A has authority over S” 
I’ve acknowledged that the service conception of authority does not provide a complete 
account of the meaning of claims of the form “A has authority over S.”26 It’s easy enough to 
show that an agent providing the Razian service for another does not necessarily have the 
standing to make demands on those for whom she would perform the Razian service. Say that a 
financial advisor27—well-versed in tax law, the workings of the stock-market, the state of the 
current business climate, and so on—knows precisely what Paul should do with his money; and 
say that Paul would do better with respect to the reasons holding for him (at least, in financial 
matters) were Paul to substitute the financial advisor’s instructions for his own. Paul is under no 
obligation to obey the financial advisor; she offers expert advice, not binding directives, and has 
no standing to make demands of Paul or to hold Paul accountable should he fail to do as she 
directs. But authority necessarily involves the power to impose obligations; if our account of 
authority does not get us that, then what have simply is not an account of authority. 
While this purported counterexample shows that we cannot take claims of the form “A 
has authority over S” to be true when and only when A would provide the Razian service to S, 
that doesn’t yet show that the service conception of authority is inaccurate, only that it is 
incomplete. In fact, this point is entirely consistent with the NJT, which, as I’ve said, is not a 
thesis about the meaning of claims of the form “A has authority over S,” but a thesis about the 
role played by directives in an agent’s practical reasoning when she regards them as authoritative, 
                                                 
26 And as Raz has acknowledged—see n. 5. 
 
27 See Stephen Darwall, “Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second-Personal,” Ethics 120 
(2010): 259. 
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and an important way in which they are justified in playing that role. Stephen Darwall identifies 
NJT with the claim “If B would do better in complying with independently existing reasons were 
B to treat A’s directives as preemptive reasons, then A has authority with respect to B.”28 But in 
this he is simply mistaken.29 
How are we to connect Raz’s account of legitimate authority with an account of claims of 
the form “A has authority over S”? I suggest that we should define institutional authority in 
terms of legitimate authority. I will flesh this idea out more completely in Section III.3. But first, 
we should take note of two arguments to the effect that the service conception of authority is 
not apt to play a role in such an account. In this section, I’ll discuss  and critique (1) Stephen 
Darwall’s argument and (2) Andrei Marmor’s argument before (3) developing more completely 
the idea that practically authoritative roles are best understood in terms of the conditions of their 
legitimacy. 
(1) Darwall’s Critique 
Darwall30 calls attention to what he describes as the “second-personal” aspect of 
authoritative demands. Authoritative instructions are necessarily addressed from one agent to 
another; they are in an important sense agent-relative. 
Darwall makes this point by distinguishing two types of reasons an agent might have to 
stop standing on another’s foot. (i) The agent might see pain as bad, and on learning that by 
stepping on the latter’s foot he creates pain, he might recognize that he has a reason to stop 
                                                 
28 Darwall, “Authority and Second-Personal Reasons for Acting,” in Reasons for Action, ed. David 
Sobel et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 150. 
 
29 See, again, n. 5. 
 
30 Darwall draws on material from his book The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and 
Accountability (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) to advance his critique of the service 
conception of authority in several articles, particularly “Authority and Second-Personal Reasons 
for Acting.” 
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standing on his victim’s foot. Anyone who points out to this agent that he is standing on 
another’s foot, or that standing on the other’s foot creates pain, or that pain is bad and ought to 
be reduced, is not giving a reason (in the sense of creating it) so much as identifying one. The 
guidance is epistemic, rather than practical: the advisor gives the agent reason to believe that he 
has a reason to get off of his victim’s foot, but does not create a new reason for action. (ii) On 
the other hand, the victim might demand that the offending agent step off. In issuing this 
demand, she does more than point out that the villain has a reason to get offer her foot. She 
creates a new one that essentially involves its being addressed to another by someone with the 
power to make demands.31 Darwall calls reasons of this second variety “second-personal” 
reasons, and I’ll adopt that terminology here. 
Darwall argues that legitimately authoritative instructions have an essentially second-
personal element, and (as such) presuppose authority and accountability relations between the 
issuer and the addressee.32 But (Darwall argues) that one agent would provide the Razian service 
for another does not necessarily earn that agent the power to issue authoritative demands that 
justify holding the latter responsible to the instructor. It is an insufficient condition on practical 
authority. (This is why the financial advisor discussed above does not have authority over Paul.) 
Moreover, he argues that the fact that agent A would provide the Razian service for agent S is 
not sufficient because it is the wrong kind of reason to justify A’s holding S responsible. Claims to 
authority (that is, claims to the standing to issue second-personal reasons) are necessarily 
justified second-personally,33 on Darwall’s account. Here, I’ll focus on this second point. 
                                                 
31 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 6-7. 
 
32 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 8. 
 
33 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 13. 
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Darwall argues that the second-personal concepts second-personal authority, valid claim, 
second-personal reason, and responsibility to are defined in terms of one another, and imply one 
another:34 authoritative claims and demands presuppose authority–subject relations which accord 
to the authority the power to create a second-personal reason that holds for the subject, which is 
a reason for the subject to comply and which renders the subject responsible to the authority for 
his compliance; and that accountability, too, implies authority–subject relations. But Darwall 
goes further: “…there is no way to break into this circle from outside it. Propositions 
formulated only with normative and evaluative concepts that are not already implicitly second-
personal cannot adequately ground propositions formulated with concepts within the circle.”35 A 
proposition of the form “A has authority over S” cannot be “grounded” (as Darwall puts it) on 
propositions that do not include second-personal reasons. By this, I take Hershovitz to mean 
that any purported justification for an agent A’s having authority over another agent S that made 
no appeal to second-personal reasons would be a failed justification, because it would include 
only the wrong kinds of reasons. That is desirable that A have authority over S, for example, 
cannot ground A’s actually having authority over S. 
Darwall argues this by drawing on the familiar point that the fact that it would be beneficial to 
believe that P is the wrong kind of reason to believe that P; we should believe that P only if we have 
evidence that P. And we should desire that P only if it is desirable that P. “Similarly,” Darwall 
argues, 
the responsible and the culpable concern norms for the distinctive attitudes and actions that 
are involved in holding people responsible and blaming them. The desirability—whether 
moral, social, personal, or otherwise—of holding them responsible, or reasons why that 
                                                 
34 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 11-12. 
 
35 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 11-12. See also “Authority and Second-Personal Reasons 
for Acting,” 145. 
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would be desirable, are simply reasons of the wrong kind to warrant doing so in the 
sense that is relevant to whether they are responsible or blameworthy.36 
 
So, agents will be justified in believing that P only if it is credible that P; agents will be justified in 
desiring that P only if it is desirable that P; and any agent A will be justified holding agent S 
accountable for φ-ing only if, in φ-ing, S is responsible to A for φ-ing. When any agent A punishes 
any agent S for φ-ing, A’s act cannot be justified on the grounds that it is desirable that S be 
punished for φ-ing because “Desirability is a reason of the wrong kind to warrant the attitudes 
and actions in which holding someone responsible consists in their own terms.”37 But (the 
argument runs) responsibility to is a second-personal concept, and S’s being responsible to A for φ-
ing presupposes that A and S stand in an authoritative relationship, that A has the standing to 
make demands on S. So (Darwall concludes) in order to justify A’s holding S accountable for φ-
ing, appeal must be made to second-personal reasons. 
But even if this argument goes through, it shows only that individual instances of one 
agent’s holding another accountable must be justified second-personally. It does not show that 
institutions affording some agents authority over others must be justified second-personally. 
When A holds S accountable for φ-ing, that act is plausibly justified only in second-personal 
terms. But that does not show that A’s having the standing to demand that S not-φ can be 
justified only in these terms. This leaves open the possibility that institutions affording to some 
agents the power to make demands on others, and that they might be justified in doing so in 
terms of a non-second-personal standard. This sort of a move has gained some traction in recent 
interpretations of Kant’s theory of punishment. As Thomas Hill observes: 
                                                 
36 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 16-17; emphasis in the original. 
 
37 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 12; emphasis removed. See also “Authority and Second-
Personal Reasons,” 139; “Authority and Reasons,” 263-64. 
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Various commentaries have suggested ways in which deterrence and retribution might be 
mixed in Kant’s theory of punishment. A common first step is to distinguish the rules 
governing the practice (or institution) of punishment from the justification of having 
such practice. Given this distinction, it has been suggested that deterrence is the justifying 
aim of having the institution and retributive policies are constitutive features of the 
institution, features that either promote the justifying end or serve as side constraints. 
Another proposal is that the threat of punishment is justified by the aim of deterring crime, 
but the execution of punishment is justified independently by considerations of justice and 
the requirement to treat persons as ends in themselves.38 
 
To be sure, the role of punishment in Kant’s political framework is not that simple,39 but that 
discussion lies beyond the scope of this paper. For now, it is enough to note that, even if 
Darwall is right that the exercise of a power to hold an agent accountable must be answerable to 
norms concerning culpability, this is not enough to show that the distribution of powers to make 
demands must be answerable to the same norms. And to my knowledge, Darwall offers no 
further arguments that would suggest that institutions placing agents in authority–subject 
relations must be justified second-personally. 
I have not shown that Darwall could not advance such an argument. But until such an 
argument is advanced, I will take it for granted it remains plausible that institutions according to 
an agent A the standing to make demands on another agent S might be justified in terms of a 
non-second-personal standard. (I’ll articulate a Razian standard in terms of which some 
authoritative roles are justified in Section III.3.) 
(2) Marmor’s Critique 
Marmor argues that what the service conception of authority misses out on is authority’s 
institutional nature: in order for an agent A to have practical authority with respect to another 
agent S, A and S must exist within an institutional framework that confers on A normative 
                                                 
38 Thomas Hill, “Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth,” in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 
36 (1998), 54; emphasis in the original. See also Sharon Byrd “Kant’s Theory of Punishment,” 
Law and Philosophy 8 (1989): 157, 184-198; Don E. Scheid, “Kant’s Retributivism,” Ethics 93 
(1983): 262-282. 
 
39 See Hill, “Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth,” 54-5 for some brief comments. 
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powers to alter S’s normative relationships—her rights and obligations with respect to others. 
This is why the financial advisor does not have authority over Paul: she doesn’t occupy an 
institutional role conferring on her normative powers to change Paul’s normative relationships. 
Moreover, Marmor argues, we can understand what it is to have such an institutional standing 
without appeal to its justification, and so can make sense of institutional roles independently of 
their justification. In other words, we should not base our conception of institutional authority 
on our conception of legitimate authority. Here, I’ll focus on this second point. 
Marmor makes the argument by offering up a case: 
The dean of our college has issued a requirement, applying to each member of the 
faculty, to submit a report of their research activities for the last five years, by a certain 
date. The dean’s instruction contained a detailed list of criteria about what counts as 
‘research activity’ and what doesn’t count. Now let us make several assumptions about 
this case: first, we will assume that the dean’s requirement is well within his official 
authority as dean. It is the kind of requirement that the dean is authorized to make. 
Second, we will assume that some of the criteria that he laid down for what counts as 
‘research activity’ are not warranted by reason; substantively, they are wrong. Finally, we 
will assume that there is a clear sense in which we, as faculty members subject to the 
dean’s authority, are obliged to comply. (Pro tanto obligation, of course, and not all things 
considered.)40 
 
Because the dean’s instruction is substantively wrong, Marmor argues that professors will not be 
helped to act in conformity with the reasons holding for them by complying. But, he points out, 
there is still a sense in which professors have an obligation to do as the dean requires, and we 
will not be able to make sense of this by appeal to the service conception of authority. Because 
the instruction is clearly wrong, there is no sense in which professors will in this case likely act in 
better conformity with the reasons holding for them than they otherwise would have done. So if 
the dean’s instruction creates a protected reason for the professors (and Marmor accepts that it 
does), then it cannot do so simply because the dean provides the Razian service for them in this 
case. 
                                                 
40 Andrei Marmor, “A Dilemma of Authority,” University of Southern California Legal Studies 
Working Paper 66 (2010): 9-10. 
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We might point out that Raz is quite comfortable with the fact that authoritative 
directives can be reasons-giving even if they are mistaken, as I noted in the sixth caveat at the 
end of Section II.2. So (one might wonder) where is the objection? According to the NJT, one 
agent S is justified in taking another agent A’s directives as protected reasons only if S is likely to 
do better by the reasons holding for him than he would were he to act on his own practical 
conclusions, and I have suggested that we can understand this to mean that S justified in taking 
A’s directives as protected reasons only if S would be justified in having a higher credence that he 
would do better by the reasons holding for him were he to take A’s directives as protected 
reasons than he would were he to act on his own practical conclusions. This higher credence will 
sometimes be justified even if A is mistaken. There are circumstances in which doctors 
misdiagnose their patients, and yet patients are still justified in taking their prescriptions as 
protected reasons. 
Perhaps Marmor means to argue that agents have reason to do as authorities instruct 
even when they are clearly mistaken. As we’ve seen, this would conflict with the Razian view. If 
Marmor means to argument that, even though the dean is clearly mistaken, his instructions are 
still reasons-giving, then he is actually making a substantive point, albeit one that we need not 
endorse. 
(3) Legitimate Authority and Authoritative Roles 
In Sections III.1 and III.2 I offered focused critiques of Darwall’s and Marmor’s 
arguments against the service conception of authority. But there is a generic point that tells 
against both of their conceptions of authority: in defining practical authority in terms of a 
particular kind of standing, Darwall and Marmor render essential to authority that which is 
derivative. Carving up our concept of authority in terms of its purpose or justification (as I 
suggest) rather than in terms of a particular kind of power yields a conceptual framework that 
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directs our attention toward that which is most important to a thorough understanding of 
authority for two reasons.  
(a) Variation in the structure of authoritative roles. First, it can help us to make sense of the 
dramatic variation in the structures of authorities’ relationships with their subjects across various 
institutional roles; and in turn, it can provide us with a standard to which this variation is 
answerable. We have seen that some agents that would perform the Razian service for another 
lack the standing to hold that other accountable for her failure to act on the instructions 
issued—viz., the financial advisor, the doctor. But there are agents who would perform the 
service, but who could not do so without the standing to hold accountable those subject to 
them—viz., the parent, the dean, the sergeant—coupled with instructions about how they should 
do so. Military contexts are particularly urgent and demand an extraordinary degree of 
coordination and commitment from the agents involved; children’s practical rational processes 
are (typically) severely underdeveloped. Without the standing to hold subjects accountable for 
their failure to act on authoritative instructions, sergeants and parents would be incapable of 
performing the Razian service. The dean is an intermediate case: without the cooperation of the 
university’s professors, the dean cannot successfully coordinate university affairs; but because 
professors have biased perspectives, will often think that the dean’s decisions are substantively 
wrong, and would often be tempted to free ride were the opportunity to present itself, they 
would frequently face incentives not to substitute the dean’s decisions for their own practical 
conclusions were they not accountable to someone for a failure to do so—incentives that could 
undermine the possibility of cooperation and thereby undermine the dean’s capacity to perform 
the Razian service. So deans’ institutional standing to hold professors accountable—or the 
institutional standing of someone within the university to do so—makes possible the provision of 
the Razian service. But because professors are (in general) mature adults, and because the 
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contexts in which deans make their decisions are less violent, and because the problems facing 
deans are typically less urgent, their right to hold professors accountable is far less robust than 
are the rights associated with military and family roles. 
Variation across these roles—sergeant, parent, dean—includes variation in the shape of 
the power to hold subjects accountable. At the limit of such variation, we find the rights 
associated with mentor roles like academic advisors. If Professor Sorenson tells her advisee 
Lawrence that he must read David Lewis’ On the Plurality of Worlds, and Lawrence fails to do so, 
Sorenson could have remarkably little standing to hold Lawrence accountable for his failure to 
do so. She can walk away from the relationship, or she can refuse to write him a letter of 
recommendation. And in doing so, she might well express to Lawrence her disappointment. But 
this is a far cry from the right that parents and sergeants have to punish insubordination, and I 
doubt that departments accord professors the right to do either of these things primarily in order 
to provide them with a means by which to impose sanctions on insubordinate advisees. 
Sorenson has a right to walk away from the relationship because, among other things, she has 
good reason not to waste her time with unserious students; and she is free to refuse to write 
Lawrence a letter of recommendation because, among other things, she simply cannot commend 
him to potential employers. Though she will be justified in being disappointed in Lawrence and 
has the means to express this disappointment, these means are both quite circumscribed and are 
not justified primarily on the basis of their serving this purpose. 
Yet I expect we are still inclined to think of Sorenson as a legitimate practical authority 
for her Lawrence, even though she might have extraordinarily little institutional standing to hold 
him accountable. What academic advisors have in common with sergeants, parents, and deans, is 
that for an agent to occupy one of these roles well is for her to help her subjects act in 
conformity with the reasons holding for them. To occupy an authoritative role is to occupy a 
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role meant to serve a purpose (in these cases, the provision of the Razian service), and I suggest 
that the (quite diverse) rights that authorities have over their subjects accrue to the agents in 
virtue of their occupation of such roles. Sergeants, parents, and deans cannot provide the Razian 
service without the right to make demands of their subjects and to hold them accountable when 
they disobey, and on these grounds we can justify structuring sergeants, parents, and deans 
normative relationships with their subjects such that they have the normative standing to make 
these demands. (We need not think that these rights accrue to agents in authoritative roles by 
any mysterious process; I expect that the dean has a power to change professors’ normative 
relationships in virtue of a background normative framework. My point is simply that these 
rights are not fundamental to the characterization of the role as authoritative. Institutions might 
purport to create roles with similar rights, but if those roles are not be justified in a way that 
practically authoritative roles are justified, then the roles themselves cannot be understood as 
practically authoritative.) 
I’ve argued that academic advisors, deans, parents, and sergeants serve a common 
generic purpose (the provision of the Razian service with respect to a particular subject matter), 
and that though their normative relationships with their subjects diverge considerably, the roles 
they occupy provide them with the tools necessary to the achievement of that proper perfection. 
Is this sufficient to ground a duty in others? Not always. Other roles have the same generic 
purpose as do sergeants, academic advisors, and parents: good financial advisors help their 
clients invest wisely, and good doctors help their patients make reasonable decisions with respect 
to their health. Neither financial advisors nor doctors have any claim on clients’ or patients’ 
obedience, nor even a normative power to change clients’ or patients’ obligations. But to afford 
them one would not help clients or patients act in conformity with the reasons holding for them, 
and might well positively impede their ability to do so. Doctors’ and financial advisors’ interest 
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in being a good authority is not sufficient reason to hold their patients or clients to be under a 
duty to obey, because they can be good authorities without the correlative right to rule, and may 
even be better equipped to perform the Razian service if subjects enjoy greater freedom in their 
relationships. (In some cases, to accord to an agent the right to another’s obedience might 
actually impede her capacity to perform the Razian service.) 
(b) Equal emphasis on powers and responsibilities. But there is an additional benefit to focusing 
on the proper perfections of institutional authoritative roles, one that is more directly relevant to 
my project in this paper. We must focus at least as much of our attention on aspects of 
authoritative roles distinct from the right to rule—in particular, on the peculiar responsibilities 
and obligations associated with various authoritative roles. These features are just as important 
to their characters as species of practically authoritative roles as are the rights and powers 
associated with them. We can make perfect sense of this if we emphasize that institutional roles 
are authoritative if and only if they have as their proper perfection the performance of the 
Razian service; but if we make a particular kind of standing central—whether the standing to 
make demands or to change subjects’ normative powers—then the responsibilities associated 
with these authoritative roles become almost accidental. The importance of the responsibilities 
and obligations associated with a practically authoritative role to its characterization as practically 
authoritative gives us a strong reason to insist that legitimate authority remain fundamental, that 
institutional authority should be defined in terms of it, and that those roles whose proper 
perfection involve the provision of the Razian service be understood as practically authoritative. 
By refocusing on the justifications for practically authoritative roles, we can both justify the 
rights accruing to them, make sense of the diversity of the structures of these rights, and give 
equal priority to these rights and to the responsibilities associated with authoritative roles. I 
suggest that we should take such claims to mean that A and S occupy an institutional role with 
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an authoritative character, and that institutional roles have an authoritative character if (i) they 
are structured in a way that renders them apt to act as authorities, and (ii) the role is justified on 
these grounds. For example, if the structure of A’s institutional relationship with S renders A apt 
for the provision of the Razian service for S, and if it is in virtue of this that A’s institutional 
relationship with S is justified, then A has authority over S. 
(Of course, because I have conceded to Hershovitz that the Razian normal justification 
is not really so normal, we might well be able to justify authoritative roles in terms of diverse 
standards. And some authoritative roles might be justified in terms of multiple standards. In 
Section V.4, I’ll argue that this is a welcome development insofar as there do seem to be some 
authoritative roles that are justified both on Razian and Hershovitzian grounds—namely, 
representatives in democratic societies—and that this dual justification is reflected in a tension 
associated with the role.) 
In the rest of this paper, I’ll suggest the kinds of responsibilities associated with (Razian) 
practical authority (and with the provision of the Razian service generally) (Sections IV and V), 
and then draw on these lessons to argue that the Rule of Law involves requirements that legal 
officials be subject to precisely such responsibilities (Section VI). 
IV. Refining the Normal Justification Thesis 
I suggested above that, when one agent A’s instructions are legitimately authoritative for 
another agent S, S’s instructed acts are more likely to conform with the reasons holding for S than 
are S’s independent acts in the sense that S should have a higher credence that his instructed acts 
will conform with the reasons holding for him than that his independent acts will. In this 
section, I’ll argue that this higher credence is justified in part on the grounds that A’s practical 
rational processes aim at bringing S’s instructed acts into conformity with the reasons holding for 
him. I’ll argue this in four steps. First, I’ll (1) invoke Raz’s dependence thesis in order to set the 
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foundation for the argument; then, I’ll (2) suggest a non-metaphorical interpretation of the 
“aiming” relationship, (3) argue that an authority’s instructions depend on the reasons holding 
for the subject when the authority’s practical reasoning (with respect to the subject) aims at 
bringing the subject’s instructed acts into conformity with the reasons holding for her, and (4) 
defend it on the grounds that it makes plausible the idea that practical authority is projectable 
into the future. 
(1) The Dependence Thesis 
Consider a machine designed to spew instructions culled randomly from a pre-defined 
set of imperatives. During some interval of time stretching from t0 to t1, it’s entirely possible that 
the device would offer some agent Simon instructions that would “get it right” more often than 
would Simon himself, so (during that interval) it might well be that S would “likely” act in better 
conformity with the reasons holding for him. But the randomizer doesn’t provide the Razian 
service for Simon. Roughly, the problem is that it isn’t a practical reasoner, and one cannot 
outsource one’s practical reasoning to something that doesn’t reason about practical matters. 
Raz expresses this point in his dependence thesis: “…all authoritative directives should be based on 
reasons which already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to 
their action in the circumstances covered by the directive.”41 Because the randomizer’s 
instructions do not depend on the reasons holding for Simon, it doesn’t count as a provider of 
the Razian service for him, and so isn’t a practical authority with respect to Simon. 
But were Simon to take the device’s outputs as protected reasons, it is true that, during 
the interval from t0 to t1, if the machine were to output the command: “φ!” Simon would (in 
some sense) likely act in better conformity with the reasons holding for him were he simply to 
do as the machine tells him, rather than try to reason the matter out for himself. The randomizer 
                                                 
41 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 47. 
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would satisfy something in the neighborhood of condition C1 with respect to Simon; it looks as 
though Simon would be justified in something like the Razian normal way in taking its 
instructions as protected reasons. So why not think that, during this interval, the device counts 
as a practical authority for Simon? What is the connection between the NJT and the dependence 
thesis?  
In order to make sense of the connection, we’ll first need to make precise what it might 
mean for an authority’s instructions to depend on the reasons holding for subjects. I’ll argue that 
an authority’s instructions depend on the reasons holding for subjects when their practical 
rational processes (with respect to the subject) aim at bringing the subject’s instructed acts into 
conformity with the reasons holding for him. Talk of an “aiming” relation is, of course, 
frustratingly metaphorical, so I will first offer a non-metaphorical interpretation before applying 
it to cases of normally justified authority. 
(2) Aiming Relations 
I suggest that we can unpack aiming relations in terms of a disposition to update 
systematically in response to evidence. Here’s a rough example of what I mean: say that an 
amateur baker is interested in producing a delicious cake. His father describes a recipe for such a 
thing to him on the phone, but neglects to tell him how long he ought to leave the cake in the 
oven. But the baker is willing to do a little experimenting. So after he mixes the ingredients, he 
puts the cake in the oven at 350°F for an hour and a half, and when he takes it out it is hard as a 
rock. So he tries again, leaving the cake in the oven for a mere hour. It is still overdone, but less 
so than the first cake. Ever persistent, he bakes the next cake for forty-five minutes, and now it 
is almost right, but he suspects that it could be better still. So he bakes a fourth cake for thirty-
five minutes, and this time the cake is just right. The baker aims at making the predicate is likely to 
produce a delicious cake true of the recipe he uses by updating his recipe in response to evidence 
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that the predicate is not true of the particular recipes he uses at particular times; and, after 
updating the recipe, the evidence each time suggests that the new recipe will be likely to produce 
a delicious cake. 
This is the sort of aiming to which functionalists about the mind might appeal in 
offering functional definitions of mental states like belief. On such definitions, we might think 
that mental processes update an agent’s beliefs in response to evidence that current set of beliefs 
contains members that are not true.42 Or consider film producers, who test their products on 
audiences in order to gauge reactions to the film; in response to evidence that the movie was 
not, say, frightening, the producers of a horror movie may take their film back into the editing 
room, or may even film some more scenes, with the expectation that after some alterations 
audiences will respond better to the film. They perform such alterations in response to evidence 
that the predicate is frightening is not true of the film; and (if they are good at their jobs) after their 
alterations the audiences will respond better to the film. 
I suggest that in general “aiming” is a three-place relationship holding for a process f, 
some x to be updated, and some predicate P: f aims at making P true of x if and only if, in 
response to evidence that P is not true of x, f (generally) updates x such that (at the very least) 
the evidence no longer shows that P is not true of x, and (when possible) the evidence positively 
shows that P is true of x. So, for example, a good football coach aims at calling winning plays if 
(i) she updates the plays she in fact calls when they are not effectively moving the ball down the 
field, and (ii) after updating, the evidence suggests that the plays she calls will effectively move 
the ball down the field. A good scientist aims at rendering a theory predictively useful if (i) he 
updates the theory in response to evidence that it is not predictively useful, and (ii) after 
updating, the evidence suggests that the theory will be predictively useful. The creators of a film 
                                                 
42 See, for example, Michael Smith “Humean Theory of Motivation,” Mind 96 (1987): 54. 
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aim at making their film frightening if (i) they update the film in response to evidence that it isn’t 
frightening, and (ii) after updating, the evidence available suggests that the film is frightening. 
It is worth emphasizing that in giving the examples above I do not intend to say, for 
example, that all scientists aim at making their theories predictively useful, nor do coaches 
necessarily aim at calling winning plays. I am not offering descriptive functionalist definitions of 
scientists or coaches any more than I am signing on to descriptive functionalist definitions of 
belief. A coach might well see evidence that the plays she calls are actually costing her team, and 
fail to update those plays. Or she might update her plays such that, after updating, they are no 
more effective than they were before (or are even less effective). In these cases, she would still 
be a coach—the role, after all, is defined institutionally—but she would be a bad coach. To be 
sure, the coach role is in part constituted by a normative orientation toward aiming at calling 
winning plays, such that a coach is a good coach only if she calls winning plays. (This was the 
point of Section III.) 
(3) The Claim 
To say that an agent S’s practical reasoning (with respect to herself) aims at bringing her 
acts into conformity with the reasons holding for her, then, is to say that, when she faces 
evidence that the conclusions of her practical rational processes do not conform with the 
reasons holding for her, she updates those conclusions appropriately. Say that Elena desires to 
buy the most fuel-efficient car available in her region, and she believes that in buying a Cadillac 
Wagon, she will be doing so. Abstracting from all other reasons holding for her, she concludes 
that she ought to buy a Cadillac Wagon. But she then reads in Consumer Report that the Cadillac 
Wagon has terrible gas mileage. Since testimony from Consumer Report about the virtues and vices 
of particular cars counts as good evidence, Elena’s practical rational processes update, and she 
now takes herself to have a reason to not buy a Cadillac Wagon. This is an instance of Elena’s 
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practical rational processes aiming at bringing her independent acts into conformity with the 
reasons holding for her; if a pattern like this holds in general, then we can say of Elena that she 
aims at bringing her independent acts into conformity with the reasons holding for her. 
I will argue that this three-place “aiming” relation must hold between (f) an agent A’s 
practical rational processes, (x) an agent S’s instructed acts, and (P) the predicate “conform with 
the reasons holding for S” if A is to qualify as a normally justified authority for S. A’s practical 
reasoning with respect to S must update in response to evidence that the conclusions of this 
practical reasoning (A’s instructions to S) do not conform with the reasons S has for acting such 
that, after having updated, the evidence no longer shows that the conclusions of A’s practical 
reasoning with respect to S do not conform with the reasons S has for acting (and, when 
possible, positively shows that S’s instructed acts do conform with these reasons). In other 
words, for any two agents A and S, A is a normally justified authority for S only if 
C2 A’s practical rational processes aim at bringing S’s instructed acts into conformity with 
the reasons holding for S. 
If a purported authority’s practical rational processes aim at bringing another agent’s acts into 
conformity with reason in the way that I have suggested, then it seems plausible that her 
instructions are based on the reasons holding for her subject—at least, insofar as the evidence 
available is not consistently misleading. She offers the instructions that she does because of the 
evidence she has seen and the implications such evidence has about the reasons holding for her 
subject, and when the evidence changes, she updates her instructions appropriately. So we can 
understand the instructions issued by authorities whose practical rational processes aim in the 
right way as depending on the reasons holding for subjects, as is required by the dependence 
thesis. 
(4) Connecting the NJT and the Dependence Thesis 
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But why think that authorities’ instructions must depend on the reasons holding for 
subjects? Why not settle for the probabilistic version of the service interpretation of the normal 
justification C1 (described at the beginning of this section) and jettison the dependence thesis 
entirely? Authority is useful as a practical concept only if its beneficial features project into the 
future. We are less interested in the successes purported authorities have enjoyed in the past 
than in the successes they will enjoy in the future; we want to know that they will enjoy continued 
success. We need a process that reliably produces good instructions, not one that accidentally has 
done so in the past. Processes that aim in the way I have suggested (a) are the sorts of things that 
are apt to be reliable (and so justify claims that authorities’ successes are projectable into the 
future), and (b) are the sorts of processes by which legitimate authorities produce practical 
conclusions for their subjects in paradigmatic cases. 
(a) Authority must be projectable. First, persistent practical rational processes that aim at 
bringing a subject’s acts into conformity with the reasons holding for that subject justify the 
projection of authority into the future. That an authority “got it right” at time t1 may be no 
reason to think that she will get it right at t2; but that she got it right at t1 because her instructions 
were the output of process f, and that process f produces the instructions the authority issues at 
t2 will justify S’s taking A’s instructions at t2. In fact, I take it that authorities’ successes in the past 
are typically taken as evidence that such a persisting state exists. When Lyndon LaRouche claims 
that he predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union before anyone else, he is not bragging that he 
got lucky; he implies that his expectation that the USSR would collapse was the result of a 
persisting rational process in virtue of which we can expect future successes. 
Moreover, if an authority’s instructions at any point fail to guide her subject toward 
action in conformity with the reasons holding for her, then insofar as she can tell that such 
failures occur, this failure itself (if evident) will count as evidence that her instructions do not guide 
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the subject toward action in conformity with the reasons, and the authority’s practical rational 
processes will update her instructions appropriately, insofar as they aim appropriately. This 
means that her instructions will be self-correcting: should she get it wrong in any particular case, 
she will eventually correct her instructions, which as a result will actually improve over time. And 
as novel problems arise, or as changing circumstances require new solutions to old problems, the 
authority’s instructions will change to fit different contexts as evidence surfaces regarding these 
novel problems. So the fact that A’s practical rational processes aim at bringing S’s instructed 
acts into conformity with the reasons holding for S grounds a projection of authority into the 
future, even if other states of affairs change. 
(b)  Paradigm cases. Second, authorities’ practical rational processes do aim appropriately in 
paradigm cases. A doctor, for example, counts as a normally justified authority for her patients if 
her prescriptions help her patients act in conformity with the reasons holding for them; and her 
prescriptions do so precisely because she updates them in response to the latest advances in 
medical science and changes in her patients’ conditions when they follow her prescriptions. 
Similarly, a coach counts as a normally authority for his team if the plays that he calls serve as 
points on which the teammates can converge, and are in general winning plays (that is, they are 
equilibria in the teammates’ incentive structures). But most good coaches (I’d venture to guess, 
all good coaches) do not call winning plays simply because they consistently get lucky, but 
because they respond to evidence about the strengths and weaknesses of the players on their 
team and on the opposing team, about the plays that have been successful in the past, about the 
plays that have been successful for other teams, and so on—and change the plays that they call 
in response to that evidence until the evidence suggests that they are calling good plays. It is 
because doctors and coaches aim in the right direction that we can expect their instructions to 
conform with the reasons holding for us. 
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We can also get at this by looking at some deviant cases. For example, those instructors 
who do not satisfy C2 are often taken to be practically authoritative precisely because they are 
thought (mistakenly) to satisfy C2. The instructions issued by readers of zodiacal signs and tarot 
cards, for example, are thought to be authoritative only insofar as the stars or the cards “hook 
up” with the reasons in a way in which, in fact, they do not. 
What about conventions, which are clearly not the result of any single individual’s 
practical rational processes? Can they, nonetheless, have authority? And if so, can they be said to 
aim in the appropriate way? It will be worthwhile to contrast conventions with similar patterns of 
general activity that are not authoritatively reasons-giving—things like prejudices, or 
uninstitutionalized power structures. These non-authoritative general patterns of activity are 
often non-authoritative because they do not help agents’ act in conformity with the reasons 
holding for them. But in addition, they are often unlikely to be appropriately responsive to 
evidence that they do not provide to agents the Razian service. When evidence surfaces that 
these general patterns of activity do not help them act in conformity with the reasons holding 
for them, they will not vanish. 
Authoritative conventions may turn into the sorts of things that are not apt to vanish in 
response to such evidence, but when they do, I suggest we should cease to think of them as 
conventions that give agents authoritative reasons. Even before evidence surfaces that the 
convention fails to provide the Razian service, some may acquire a special interest in the 
maintenance of the convention—say, because they have invested their resources on the 
assumption that the convention would persist, or because their livelihoods depend on the role 
they play within the convention. Or agents may develop prejudices that tell against abandoning 
the convention. Under these circumstances, the convention ceases to depend on the reasons 
holding for agents; it depends, instead, on those social factors maintaining it. Agents may still 
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have reason to conform to the convention, but because the convention no longer depends on 
the reasons holding for them, the convention is not authoritative; it does not give agents a 
protected reason to conform to it because they will not be justified in taking it for granted that the 
convention provides the Razian service. (This gives us a convenient framework within which to 
make sense of bureaucratic standard operating procedures, which come into being in order to 
solve problems, but which then become entrenched and take on a life of their own, often 
impeding the bureaucracy’s capacity to perform its functions efficiently.) But if the convention is 
of a type to vanish in response to evidence that it does not provide the Razian service, then we 
can think of the convention as aiming appropriately, and so can think of the convention as 
practically authoritative. 
It is worth emphasizing that C2 only expresses a necessary condition on legitimate 
authority. For A to be a legitimate authority for S, it is certainly not enough that an agent’s 
practical reasoning with respect to another aim at bringing that agent’s actions into conformity 
with the reasons holding for her. A doctor, for example, is not a practical authority simply 
because her practical reasoning with respect to her patient aims at bringing her patient’s actions 
into conformity with the reasons (concerning her health) that hold for the patient, but 
additionally because she has encountered copious evidence that the patient has never 
encountered. And on a football team, every player might well be quite qualified to learn from 
past failures and mistakes, and to use this experience to call winning plays; but not all of them 
can plausibly be authorities for their teammates, or the coordination problem they face would go 
unresolved. 
Condition C2 does tell us something about the justification for subjects’ higher credence 
that their instructed acts will conform with the reasons holding for them than that their 
independent acts will. We should take C1 to require that subjects would be justified in having a 
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higher credence that their instructed acts would conform with the reasons holding for them than 
they would that their independent acts would conform with the reasons holding for them; and 
this credence will be justified on the grounds that (i) the instructor’s practical rational processes 
aim in the right condition (satisfaction of C2) and (ii) the authority has superior access to 
evidence, or superior rational processes, or a capacity to coordinate the interactions of multiple 
agents, or freedom from bias and passion, etc. It is because of these features that we can expect 
authoritative instructions to help us act in conformity with the reasons holding for us, and this is 
how we should take the qualifier “likely” in condition C1. So the complete condition on 
legitimate practical authority is: 
C* S will be justified in taking A’s instructions as authoritative in the normal way if and only 
if: 
 A. The matter is not on one which it would be better that S choose for S-self, and 
 C1. S’s instructed acts would likely conform better with the reasons holding for S than would 
S’s independent acts; and this, only if 
 C2. A’s practical rational processes aim at bringing S’s instructed acts into conformity with 
the reasons holding for S. 
In sum: in paradigmatic cases of authority, subjects take the authority’s instructions as protected 
reasons because (C1) they take themselves to be more likely to act in conformity with the 
reasons holding for them, in part because (C2) they regard the authority’s practical reasoning as 
aimed appropriately at bringing her instructions into conformity with the reasons the subjects 
have for acting. This refinement of Raz’s service conception of authority has important 
implications for the way that we think about authoritative roles and concepts, including law. I 
begin to consider these in the next two sections. 
V. Deriving Procedural Constraints 
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In the discussion so far, I’ve argued that a commitment to the service conception of 
authority ought to carry with it an interest in the processes by which authorities arrive at their 
decisions. On the refined service conception of authority, a decision-making process is 
authoritative for a group of people if and only if the process is responsive to evidence about the 
reasons holding for subjects and reliably produces instructions that track the reasons holding for 
subjects as best it can, given the evidence. In this section, I will discuss some of the implications 
of this refinement of the service conception: namely, that it requires (1) that authorities 
acknowledge their epistemic limitations on certain matters and encourage the participation of 
those without such limitations in authoritative decision-making; (2) that authorities encourage, 
take notice of, and even participate in normative discourse; and (3) that authoritative decision-
making open itself up to critique by subjects by making its processes generally public. Processes 
that do not satisfy these requirements are not open to important parts of the evidence about the 
reasons holding for legal subjects, so cannot be responsive to that evidence, and so (in light of 
what we learned in Section IV) cannot be fully legitimate providers of the Razian service. 
Finally (4), I will return to the concerns we raised in Section II.3, that involving subjects 
in decision-making processes stands in tension with the spirit of the service conception of 
authority; that evidence that an agent’s or institution’s authority involves a processual element 
counts as evidence that the authority is justified on the communitarian grounds that Hershovitz 
emphasizes; and that, if it doesn’t, then there is no principled way in which we can judge 
whether (or to what extent) an agent’s or institution’s authority depends on communitarian 
rather than Razian grounds (or vice versa) in virtue of facts about its processual elements. 
(1) Consultations with Experts and Subjects 
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If practical authorities must be responsive to evidence about the reasons holding for 
legal subjects, then where they are subject to epistemic limitations, they must consult with those 
free of limitations, particularly experts and subjects themselves. 
(a) Appeal to experts. Typically, legislators and judges are not experts in those spheres of 
activity for which they enact regulations. Nevertheless, they can and often do (and, according to 
condition C2, should) appeal to experts for testimony about the ways in which such regulations 
should be crafted. The earnest reception of testimony from climatologists prior to the enactment 
of legislation establishing regulations on the types of automobiles to be sold within the 
jurisdiction lends to such regulations the capacity to help those with a reason not to contribute 
to the destruction of our climate to act in conformity with that reason. By making an appeal to 
experts, legislators acquire evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects and so attempt 
to satisfy condition C2. 
(b) Appeal to subjects. If individuals have privileged access to some of the evidence about 
the reasons holding for them, then in order to be open to this evidence an authority must be 
willing to consult the individual. (This is an epistemic point, not a point about the nature of 
reasons. Whatever we take reasons to be, it seems quite clear that individuals have privileged 
access to at least some of the evidence about the reasons holding for them.) 
Many accreditation and certification processes illustrate this point nicely. To acquire a 
license to practice medicine, for example, one must satisfy a set of requirements largely settled 
on by medical doctors themselves, precisely because these doctors have privileged access to 
evidence about the kinds of conditions one must satisfy if one is to practice medicine 
successfully. Nonetheless, it is the government that requires that aspiring doctors acquire a medical 
license before practicing medicine. The medical community identifies a set of experts taken to 
have access to some important reasons holding for aspiring medical doctors, who then report on 
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those reasons to the government, which then (on the basis of these reports) issues a set of 
instructions to the medical community compliance with which helps medical practitioners 
comply with the reasons holding for them. Obviously, legislators are not normally in a position 
to issue useful instructions to medical doctors about how best to practice medicine, but they put 
themselves into a position to do so by appealing to reports offered by medical doctors about the 
reasons holding for medical doctors. 
Moreover, it should be uncontroversial that legitimate authorities must discover the 
details of the particular scenarios confronting subjects before they will be able to derive practical 
conclusions about what subjects should do in those situations. Once they understand the 
subtleties of the scenarios, they may be in a better position than the subject to identify the acts 
that will best conform with the reasons holding for the subjects—but they cannot possibly make 
this identification until they understand these subtleties. But learning about these subtleties might 
well require that they appeal to the subjects themselves for information. Presumably, this is why 
doctors ask patients about their symptoms and take their personal and family histories. Perhaps 
they could discover evidence about patients’ illnesses simply by administering every conceivable 
test as soon as the patient enters the clinic, but to do so would be wildly inefficient. 
I have at least shown that direct consultation with an agent is sometimes the most 
efficient method by which one can acquire evidence about the reasons holding for that agent. In 
some cases, I suspect that it may be the only effective method. Say that a patient has an infection 
in his leg, and that the infection can be dealt with in at least two ways: the doctor can amputate 
the leg, or she can prescribe a medication that will eliminate the infection but that will have one 
lasting side effect: every day just after noon, the patient will suffer a crippling headache for about 
fifteen minutes. Under some circumstances, the doctor may be in a position to acquire some 
evidence (however weak) about the reasons holding for the patient in this case, even without 
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consulting him. If the patient is a professional sprinter, for example, the doctor may have reason 
to think that the patient would be willing to put up with the headaches. But even in this case, the 
best evidence to be had will be acquired by asking the patient which treatment he’d prefer. This 
will be even more abundantly the case if the patient is not unusually dependent on the 
maintenance of his leg—say, if he works behind a desk and is generally uninterested in sports. In 
these situations, for the doctor to fail to ask the patient which treatment he’d prefer is for the 
patient to fail to seek out and respond to important evidence about the reasons holding for the 
patient; it would be for the doctor to fail to satisfy condition C2 identified above, and thereby to 
surrender a degree of her legitimacy as an authority for the patient. 
Philosophical treatments of consent (as it is exercised here) focus on patients’ exercise of 
their (legal) normative powers, but it is important to notice that, in the process of securing 
informed consent, doctors will uncover important evidence about the reasons holding for their 
patients—evidence to which she might previously have been blind.  To be sure, I do not mean 
to argue for a complete revision of our understanding of consent and its role in medical 
contexts. Certainly we have a practice by which patients exercise (at the very least legally) 
normative powers to permit their doctors to interfere in their bodily functions, and we typically 
refer to this practice as consenting. I don’t want to suggest that we should stop understanding 
the practice in this way, nor need we think of consent merely as a mechanism by which we offer 
reports about our reasons. I do want to suggest that we might justify the practice at least in part 
on the grounds that a doctor can be fully legitimately authoritative for a patient only if that 
doctor is responsive to evidence about the reasons holding for the patient, and that in spite of 
doctors’ technical expertise, patients have privileged access to at least some of the reasons 
holding for them. So we institutionalize practices requiring that doctors consult patients about 
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the reasons holding for the latter, notably by requiring that doctors acquire their patients’ 
consent before administering medications or performing surgery. 
To some extent, then, because legitimate authorities must seek out evidence about the 
reasons holding for their subjects, they must in many cases actually consult with experts and 
subjects in order to arrive at useful instructions. This is an important upshot of the refined 
service conception of authority previously underemphasized in the standard Razian account. 
(2) Employment of Discursive Processes 
Experts’ testimony and agents’ self-reports about the reasons holding for them do not 
constitute all of the evidence that a legitimate authority can acquire about the reasons holding 
for her subjects. This is because agents can be mistaken about the reasons holding for them; 
their reports may be subject to error. By this, I do not mean only that we can be mistaken about 
the mere “matters of fact” that bear on the reasons that hold for us, though this should be fairly 
uncontroversial. There are also ways we can be mistaken about the reasons holding for us even 
when we are in relatively good epistemic positions with respect to these sorts of “matters of 
fact.” For example, we can misinterpret our own desires, fail to understand what counts as 
satisfying a desire, or pay inadequate attention to the relations that hold among our desires. Say I 
arrive at Morton’s deli looking forward to a delicious sandwich only to discover that Morton’s 
has closed shop, and I start to consider other ways of acquiring a sandwich and ultimately decide 
that I had better get to the Burger King across the street. Too late do I realize that I did not 
desire any food product consisting in meat and vegetables packaged between two slices of bread; 
I desired a good sandwich. This, I think, is a familiar enough phenomenon. Similarly, we can be 
confused about the sorts of principles to which we commit (what does it mean to demand 
equality?), or about the applicability of a normatively-laden concept (say, “person”) to an 
individual. 
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But there exists a method by which we attempt to overcome the fallibility of our own 
judgments about the reasons holding for us, and this method is fundamentally argumentative or 
discursive. By engaging in earnest discussion, we can help one another clarify our normative 
concepts and revise our understandings of the reasons holding for us. In general, I suggest that 
normative discourse—at least when it is earnest, and not mere “intellectual coercion or 
deceit”43—consists in interlocutors’ attempts to provide evidence to one another about the 
reasons they take to hold for themselves and for each other. There are a number of ways in 
which such discussions can go. Our interlocutors can encourage us to clarify the nature of a 
single reason that we take to hold for us by forcing us to consider whether or not we understand 
the reason in the right way. My interlocutors can grant that I have a reason to φ, but can point 
out that ψ-ing does not count as φ-ing—even though I have taken ψ-ing to be a way (perhaps 
even the primary way) by which one φ’s. So, for example, I may take myself to have a reason to 
do well professionally, but if my interlocutor presents to me cases like that of Ebenezer Scrooge 
or Ivan Ilyich, I may find myself forced to examine precisely what I mean by “to do well 
professionally,” and even to wonder if this reason isn’t derivative of another reason—say, a 
reason to provide for my family—the discovery of which may help me to better discern the ways 
in which I can act in conformity with the reasons holding for me. And our interlocutors can also 
bring to our attention previously unidentified dissonances between two reasons that we take to 
hold for us—as between, say, a reason to ensure our financial security in the future and a reason 
to enjoy ourselves today. Merely by pointing out to us that, in living profligately, we risk leaving 
ourselves unprepared for future challenges; or that, in being overly cautious, we are letting our 
                                                 
43 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 17. 
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lives pass us by, an interlocutor can force us to clarify the relationship between our reasons to 
prepare for the future and to enjoy today.  
In making these sorts of clarifications, we often appeal to a principle of universalizability, 
according to which “for the present instance of circumstances C to count as a reason now for 
reaching decision D, and acting on D, it would have to be acceptable to hold a decision of type 
D appropriate whenever an instance of C occurs.”44 The presentation of instances of C in which 
we seem to have no reason to reach decision D is generally taken to provide evidence that 
instances of C do not count as unqualified reasons to reach decision D; if we are to respond to 
the new evidence, it must be either by reevaluating our understanding of why we ought to reach 
decision D or (if satisfactory reevaluation proves impossible) by taking ourselves to have no 
reason to reach D after all. And there may be other discursive tools by which we explore the 
reasons holding for us. 
Now, where substantive differences exist in the norms holding for two agents, normative 
discourse will not be up to the challenge of overcoming it: one agent cannot through 
argumentation change the reasons holding for another, so that if Kantian (and only Kantian) 
reasons do hold for Ted, then the utilitarian Norma will not be able to rationally persuade Ted to 
abandon Kantianism.45 But each can help the other to recognize the implications of her 
commitments, to see how standards apply in different contexts, to recognize tensions between 
                                                 
44 MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, 21. 
 
45 Though I suspect that discursive processes are not merely processes by which we come to 
discover the reasons holding for us, but also an important way in which reasons are created. 
Through our joint engagement in the process of argumentation, you and I create a narrative that 
lends structure and meaning to features of our interactions outside of or tangential to the 
argumentation that generate new reasons for each of us. We forge and then give shape to a 
relationship that will impose constraints on the ways that we should treat each other and 
understand one another. This, I suspect, is roughly how the establishment of a friendship can 
generate new reasons for the parties to the friendship. But the content of normative discourse 
does not reveal these new reasons; it is the structure of (respectful and earnest) discourse that 
can (though won’t necessarily) generate these new reasons. 
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two standards that a single agent might endorse, and to revise her standards when she sees that 
they fail to give her the reasons she had expected of them. Even two agents for whom 
substantively different reasons hold can benefit from normative discussion along these lines. 
The upshot of all of this is that, for an agent A to count as a full-fledged legitimate 
authority over another agent S, given that A must be open to evidence about the reasons holding 
for S, in addition to consulting S and experts on the matters of fact pertaining to S, A must pay 
attention to (and even encourage) earnest discussion about the reasons holding for S. 
(3) Publicity of Decisions and of Decision-Making Processes 
Finally, fully legitimate authorities must in general submit their decision-making 
processes to public scrutiny. The primary reason for this is that, by allowing subjects to identify 
the evidence that authorities have collected and the processes by which they derive instructions 
from that evidence, legitimate authorities create space for subjects (including experts) to offer 
corrections by pointing out evidence that is missing and critiquing the authority’s interpretation 
of the evidence. This is the generalized form of academic peer-review, and the evidence 
produced about the reasons holding for subjects will surely prove invaluable to legitimate 
authorities. 
Equally importantly, allowing public scrutiny of authoritative processes will give subjects 
evidence that the instructions delivered are, in fact, based on the reasons holding for them. 
Without a view into the inner workings of authoritative processes, subjects may well be able to 
identify a correlation between the instructions offered by a purported authority and the 
instructions by which they would do well. But if they cannot ascertain and assess the underlying 
procedures yielding these instructions as output, important questions will remain. Subjects may 
worry that they are being manipulated, rather than helped; or that the purported authority’s 
success so far has been a mere accident, and could vanish relatively soon; or that the purported 
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authority will be successful only in very limited conditions that are likely not to last. If subjects 
are to be justified in taking the purported authority’s instructions as protected reasons, they must 
have access to this sort of evidence. An important way by which authorities can help subjects to 
overcome these worries is to make evident the relationship between the existing evidence about 
the reasons holding for subjects, and the instructions the authority offers. 
(4) Authority and its Procedural Elements 
Recall that Hershovitz has argued that the fact that we regard some authority as 
illegitimate on procedural grounds is evidence that the authority in question is not (solely) justified 
on Razian grounds. But this isn’t necessarily so. The procedurally flawed government to which 
Hershovitz appeals in the passage quoted in Section II.3 might well issue instructions by which 
subjects are likely (in some sense) to act in conformity with the reasons holding for them, but it 
does not satisfy the refined Razian condition for which I have argued. Its instructions do not 
depend on the reasons holding for its subjects because it does not seek out evidence about the 
reasons holding for them; it only seeks out evidence about the reasons holding for a privileged, 
enfranchised few. The fact that its instructions during a given period of time do help even the 
marginalized many act in better conformity with the reasons holding for them than they would 
have done had they acted on their own practical conclusions is a matter of mere happenstance, a 
quite contingent fact that may well be quite fragile: more than slight changes in circumstances 
could undermine it entirely. So (on the modified Razian picture) we should not conclude on the 
basis of this fact alone that the government in question has legitimate authority with respect to 
all of its subjects; for this to be the case, it must arrive at useful instructions in the right way. 
And in order to do this, it must (at least occasionally) ask the purported subjects about the 
reasons holding for them. It might do so by holding elections, or by staging plebiscites, or by 
running public forums in which subjects are given the opportunity to voice their opinion directly 
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to the ruling parties. But the government under consideration does not consult all of its subjects 
about the reasons holding for them, so its instructions cannot be said to be based on the reasons 
holding for all of its subjects. So it is not legitimate, on the modified service conception of 
legitimate authority. 
Of course, this doesn’t mean that Hershovitz’ communitarian justification just is the 
refined Razian justification. It surely isn’t enough to get us the claim that authoritative decisions 
belong to the subject in the way that a community’s decisions (expressed through procedurally 
correct law) are supposed to belong to the members of the community. And, on the 
communitarian account Hershovitz sketches, involving subjects in decision-making processes is 
important because it counts as respecting their dignity and autonomy, independent of the fact that 
it will also provide an important source of evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects. 
But it does show that the mere fact that we sometimes regard authorities as illegitimate on 
procedural grounds does not necessarily count as evidence that their authority is based in 
considerations of the sort that Hershovitz emphasizes. 
We’re now in a position to return to the two concerns raised at the end of Section II.3. 
First, I’ve argued that subjects must be involved in decision-making processes, that 
legitimate authorities will consult with them, will foster and participate in normative discussion 
(partly, perhaps, with subjects), and will be responsive to critiques of authoritative decisions and 
decision-making processes (some of which subjects may voice). But one might worry that this 
much participation by subjects in decision-making processes stands in tension with the service 
conception of authority. We might put the point this way. A fundamental assumption underlying 
the service conception of authority is that (i) subjects are in some significant way unable to 
assess the reasons holding for them. But I argue that authorities must consult with subjects 
because subjects have privileged access to some evidence about the reasons holding for them, 
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which roughly amounts to the claim that (ii) subjects are in some significant way uniquely able to 
assess the reasons holding for them. But claims i and ii contradict one another. Conclusion: the 
project is misguided from the get-go. 
There are two points to be made here. The first is relatively superficial: claims i and ii 
don’t contradict one another, of course. That an agent S has unique access to some of the evidence 
about the reasons holding for him is not the same as any of the following claims. (iii) S has 
exclusive access to the evidence about the reasons holding for him. (iv) S has access to all of the 
available evidence about the reasons holding for him. (v) S knows how to interpret all of the 
evidence about the reasons holding for him to which he is privy. If any of these claims are false, 
then although a subject S might have privileged access to some of the evidence about the reasons 
holding for him, there might be other agents who also have access to evidence about the reasons 
holding for S, there might be evidence to which S is not privy, and S might be unable to interpret 
some of the evidence to which he is privy. Let’s consider a few cases before getting to the more 
fundamental point. 
Against claim (v). That S has privileged access to evidence about the reasons holding for 
her does not entail that S knows how to interpret that evidence. When Elena visits Doctor 
Penrose because she has a persistent pain in her knee, at the beginning of their visit she will 
begin by describing the pain, locating it, identifying the times at which it is strongest. This 
testimony identifies for Penrose evidence about the reasons holding for her, but it is not 
evidence that Elena is equipped to interpret. That it is a pain of type such-and-such rather than 
of type so-and-so might be evidence about the cause of the pain, and so might be evidence 
about the steps Elena ought to take to alleviate it, but Elena will be in no position to recognize 
that. Penrose likely will be, and will be equipped to arrive at a practical conclusion about what 
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Elena must do: “Take two Zanotabs twice daily,” he’ll instruct, and she will be justified in taking 
the prescription as a protected reason to take two Zanotabs twice daily. 
Against (iii) and (iv). Even if the subject S is in a position to interpret the evidence to 
which she has privileged access, the scope of that access might be fairly narrow. It might be that, 
although S has privileged access to some of the evidence about the reasons holding for her, 
agent A has access to other evidence, and perhaps quite a bit; under circumstances like these, S 
might well do better by the reasons holding for her if she provides the evidence to which she has 
privileged access to A, lets A figure it in with the evidence to which she has access, and then 
treats A’s instruction as a protected reason. Say that a group of people are engaged in a complex 
and dynamic activity and have a common goal—say, they are playing football. The activity is 
complex enough that some of the reasons holding for any one member of the group will depend 
on the reasons holding for other members, but circumstances change rapidly enough that no 
settled pattern of activity will help them to act in conformity with the reasons holding for them. 
One agent must organize the activities of each member of the offense, but each member has 
privileged access to some of the evidence about the reasons holding for them—that is, no single 
player has access to all of the evidence about the reasons holding for everyone else. So the 
quarterback acts as a sort of aggregator of evidence, taking in testimony from the various other 
players and factoring that evidence into his decision-making processes in choosing which play to 
call. The wide receiver may know that the opposing defense’s cornerback is doing a good job of 
preventing her from executing a move essential to play α, and likely will even recognize this as a 
reason for each member of the team not to attempt to execute play α. But it is a reason that may 
be outweighed by other considerations to which the wide receiver is not privy, but with which 
other members of the team are acquainted; they will point these considerations out to the 
quarterback, who will weigh the various considerations and come to a decision. The members of 
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the team participate in the decision-making process, but in the end it is the quarterback’s decision 
which play to call—not the team’s. 
This last observation brings us to the more fundamental point. That authorities involve 
subjects in authoritative decision-making processes does not require that subjects be involved at 
all stages in those processes. And we can distinguish at least two stages: there is the evidence-
gathering stage, at which authorities collect evidence about the reasons holding for their subjects; 
and there is the decision-making stage, at which authorities exclude the excluded reasons holding 
for subjects, balance the remaining reasons, and arrive at a practical conclusion, the authoritative 
directive. Agents can be involved in the decision-making process at the evidence-gathering stage, 
and remain excluded from the decision-making stage. By way of illustration, consider the role 
played by advisors in the decision-making of a head of government. An advisor on foreign 
affairs will provide testimony about the international scene, an advisor on the domestic economy 
will provide testimony about local markets, an advisor on environmental issues will provide 
testimony about pollution within the country and its effects on subjects’ health, and so on. 
These advisors are all involved at the evidence-gathering stage, but ultimately the decision will be 
made solely by the head of government; she has the responsibility of balancing the evidence to 
which her advisors have made her privy, and her decision is hers alone. The arguments that I 
have deployed in this section show only that subjects must be involved in decision-making 
processes at the evidence-gathering stage; actual decision-making will remain the prerogative of 
the agent in authority. 
This point yields a principled distinction between the procedural elements associated 
with Razian authority, and the procedural elements associated with the communitarian authority 
that Hershovitz emphasizes. Agents can be involved by participating actual decision-making, or 
merely by contributing evidence at the evidence-gathering stage. Agents belonging to an 
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assembly or executive board all participate in the assembly’s decision-making process at the stage 
of actual decision-making, but other agents can be involved merely at the evidence-gathering 
stage. By taking stock of the way that subjects are involved in authoritative-decision-making 
processes, we can be clear about the kind of authority that is at stake. 
Of course, Hershovitz notes quite rightly that democratic institutions are best justified 
both in terms of their involvement of subjects in decision-making processes and in terms of their 
aptitude for the provision of the Razian service. But (one might worry) this brings the initial 
problem into harsh relief. Does this mean that democratic processes involve subjects at the 
information-gathering stage and at the decision-making stage? How are we to make sense of this? 
In fact, I think (as I hinted at the end of Section III.3) that this problem rightly reflects a genuine 
tension in the roles of representatives’ within representative democracies. Their roles are 
authoritative, but they are justified in terms of multiple standards, and this pulls them in 
different directions. On the one hand, they are meant to delegates of their districts, sent to 
parliament to speak for their constituents, and by their participation to involve the members of 
their districts in public decision-making processes. On the other, they act as trustees with 
sufficient autonomy decide for themselves how they should vote. Edmund Burke, in defending 
the trustee model of representative democracy, argued that “Your representative owes you, not 
his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to 
your opinion.”46 Representatives must balance competing demands—that they speak for their 
constituents, and that they provide for their constituents the Razian service—precisely because 
democracy is best justified both on communitarian and Razian grounds. 
VI. Law’s Procedural Aspects and its Claim to Authority 
                                                 
46 Edmund Burke, “Speech to the Electors of Bristol,” in The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund 
Burke, vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1869), 95. 
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We’re now in a position to apply the lessons of Sections IV and V to law. In this section, 
I’ll advance three points: first, that (1) law claims legitimate (Razian) authority, and that (2) it 
expresses this claim through requirements that courtroom officials be open to and appropriately 
responsive to evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects; second, that (3) an emphasis 
on these requirements against legal positivism; and third, that (4) by emphasizing law’s 
procedural aspects, we can derive an important connection between the concept of law and the 
Rule of Law. 
(1) Law’s Claim to Authority 
Raz has argued that law necessarily claims legitimate authority over legal subjects: “The 
law presents itself as a body of authoritative standards and requires all those to whom they apply 
to acknowledge their authority.”47 This is the claimed legitimacy thesis (CLT). In support of this 
thesis, Raz points out that law addresses legal subjects in the terms with which agents address 
those over whom they have authority.48 Law orders certain actions and proscribes others, 
imposes obligations and makes demands. If we are to make sense of this phenomenon (Raz 
argues), we would do well to understand law’s language as expressive of something internal to 
law, namely, that it claims authority. 
These are weak grounds on which to rest the CLT, but there is an even deeper problem 
here. Because Raz takes his “normal” justification of authority really to be the normal justification 
of authority, he understands law’s claim to legitimate authority over legal subjects necessarily to 
be a claim that law provides for legal subjects the Razian service. But if we are persuaded by 
Hershovitz’s critique (discussed in Section II.3) that the “normal” justification is not exclusively 
normal, and that there are other important justifications of authority, then even if CLT is 
                                                 
47 Raz, “Authority of Law,” 33. 
 
48 Cf. Raz, “Authority, Law, and Morality,” The Monist 68 (1985): 300. 
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correct—even if law does claim legitimate authority over legal subjects—it isn’t clear that law 
claims to provide for legal subjects the Razian service. 
From now on, I’ll take CLT to be the thesis that law claims, not merely legitimate 
authority over legal subjects, but Razian authority—that is, law claims to provide the Razian 
service for legal subjects. What sort of evidence might we collect in support of CLT, understood 
in this way? I suggest that the sorts of institutions with which legal systems are typically 
associated, the ways in which these systems are structured and the types of evidence to which 
they are responsive are important aspects of law’s self-presentation.49 If law is peculiarly 
associated with institutions apt for the provision of the Razian service—institutions that are 
open to and appropriately responsive to evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects—
then I suggest that we should count this as evidence in favor of CLT. 
In the next sub-section, I’ll turn my attention to an institution peculiarly associated with 
legal systems—namely, the court—to argue that on ordinary conceptions of such institutions they 
are apt for the provision of the Razian service, and that this provides us with evidence that law 
claims to provide the Razian service. 
(2) Courts as Providers of the Razian Service 
In their writings on courts, positivists like Hart and Raz emphasize their role as appliers of 
the law. To be sure, such positivists make considerable room for judicial discretion. Hart argues 
that though legal rules provide determinate answers to a “core” of easy cases, legal subjects are 
bound to run into hard cases on which legal rules provide no determinate answers; these cases 
fall into the rule’s “penumbra,” and on these cases judges are licensed to exercise a secondary 
                                                 
49 Waldron has helpfully advanced and developed this sort of strategy. See especially his “The 
Concept and the Rule of Law,” Georgia Law Review 43 (2008-2009): 13-19. 
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legislative function, determining a correct answer through an exercise of judicial discretion.50 
And Raz certainly thinks that courts should be places in which courtroom reasoning does appeal 
to considerations external to the law.51 But the methodological positivist conception of the court 
is a conception of something that is primarily and essentially norm-applying. Raz might well agree 
that a court that fails to take extra-legal considerations into account is not the sort of institution 
we want in our legal system, but the institution would be, without qualification, a court.52 The 
essence of courts, on these accounts, consists in their application of legal norms, not in their 
revision of them. 
But in ordinary discourse (as Waldron observes), it is appropriate to reserve the term 
“court” to those institutions that accept subjects’ testimonies and encourage argumentation: 
…the operation of a court involves a way of proceeding that offers to those who are 
immediately concerned an opportunity to make submissions and present evidence, such 
evidence being presented in an orderly fashion according to strict rules of relevance and 
oriented to the norms whose application is in question… Once presented, the evidence 
is then made available to be examined and confronted by the other party in open court. 
Each party has the opportunity to present arguments and submissions at the end of this 
process and reply to those of the other party. Throughout the process, both sides are 
treated respectfully and above all listened to by a tribunal that is bound to attend to the 
evidence presented and respond to the submissions that are made in the reasons that are 
given for its eventual decision.53 
 
I argue that a conception of courts as institutions apt for the performance of the Razian service 
aligns more closely with the layperson’s conception that Waldron identifies. Courts involve 
                                                 
50 H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harvard Law Review 71 
(1958): 606-607; The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), esp. Chapter 7 
(“Formalism and Rule-Scepticism”). 
 
51 See Raz, “Law and Value in Adjudication,” in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 180-209. 
 
52 Raz, Practical Reason, 134-136. See also Waldron, “The Concept of Law and the Rule of Law,” 
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structures by which they (a) consult with subjects, (b) foster normative discourse, and (c) make 
public the reasoning by which decisions were reached; and (d) judges have both the standing to 
tailor the law’s requirements in response to the evidence they acquire through these processes, 
and a responsibility (as judges) to base their decisions on that evidence. 
(a) Consultation with legal subjects. In a discussion of adjudication, Fuller argued that its 
essence “lies in the mode of participation it accords the affected party.”54 Adjudication, on 
Fuller’s view, occurs not simply when one party—the judge—surveys a state of affairs and 
applies a rule to it, but when the parties being judged retain an opportunity to make their case 
with reasoned arguments and proofs.55 The important point is that courts guarantee to plaintiff 
and defendant alike the opportunity to present their view of the facts. In this respect, courts 
differ from, say, umpires in baseball, who apply norms without guaranteeing to baseball players 
(those to whom the norms are applied) the right to make their case; and from decision-making 
processes (like elections) in which agents are given the chance to make their case, but it is not 
guaranteed that anyone will listen.56 Because courts guarantee to those who come before them 
both that they will have an opportunity to speak, and that they will be heard, they institutionalize 
the sorts of consultations identified in Section V.1 as necessary to fully legitimate authority. 
(b) Normative discourse. Moreover, these sorts of consultations do not occur in isolation, 
but within a context of argumentation peculiar to legal fora. Courtroom discourse, as Waldron 
observed, is subject to institutionalized standards of rationality. Evidence is presented according 
to rules requiring that it be relevant to and instructive about the case at hand, and it is made 
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55 Fuller, “Forms and Limits of Adjudication,” 108. 
 
56 Fuller, “Forms and Limits of Adjudication,” 108-109. 
 
 
 62 
available to the all parties to the discussion. Claims made about the evidence are subject to 
challenge, and such challenges must be met. As Neil MacCormick puts the point, 
…legal argumentation must be acknowledged to be one special case of general practical 
reasoning, and must thus conform to conditions of rationality and reasonableness that 
apply to all sorts of practical reasoning. This implies at least that there may not be 
assertions without reasons—whatever is asserted may be challenged, and, upon 
challenge, a reason must be offered for whatever is asserted, whether the assertion is of 
some normative claim or a claim about some state of affairs, some ‘matter of fact’.57 
 
In this respect, courts differ from decision-making processes held to no institutionalized 
standards of rationality. Consider another contrast between adjudication and elections. If a 
participant in pre-election discourse makes a misleading speech, or offers up for public 
consumption a manipulative advertisement that appeals to the baser instincts of the electorate, 
the participant has done something objectionable, but has not necessarily flouted any 
institutionalized rules about the types of discourse allowed prior to elections. But in court, if a 
participant in legal proceedings offers in the place of legal reasoning a manipulative ad hominem 
attack, or attempts to distort facts by asking leading questions, or attempts to intimidate 
witnesses, then other participants in the discussion have the opportunity to call him out for his 
abuse and to ask that the episode play no role in the court’s decision, and the court has a 
responsibility to be responsive to such requests. The agent in the wrong can even be 
reprimanded for violating the norms of courtroom discourse, say, by being held in contempt of 
court. In this way, courts institutionalize norms of rational discourse that both focus their 
consultations with legal subjects in a way that is apt to isolate evidence about the reasons holding 
for legal subjects, and make possible the sorts of normative discourse that is apt to provide 
evidence about the reasons holding for them, thus institutionalizing a second evidence-gathering 
procedure identified as central to fully legitimate authority in Section V.2. 
                                                 
57 MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, 17. 
 
 
 63 
(c) Publicity of the evidence on which the decision was based. Third, judges typically give reasons 
justifying the decision they reached. Fuller notes that this is not always the case, but where it isn’t 
I suspect it is only because there are unusual considerations that defeat presumptive reasons in 
favor of the publication of reasoned opinions.58 And there are several such presumptive reasons. 
As Fuller points out, the publication of judges’ reasoned opinions makes evident to participants 
in legal processes the role that their participation in courtroom discourse played in the judge’s 
reasoning, persuading them that the judge’s practical rational processes were responsive to their 
claims. (I made this same point in Section V.3.) In addition, however, judges’ defenses of their 
decisions provide the fodder for discussions within the legal community and the community at 
large of the decision and its justification, much of which will turn up further evidence about the 
reasons holding for legal subjects. Legal scholars, public intellectuals, scientists, politicians, and 
ordinary citizens will debate the decision, critique it, and offer reinterpretations of the evidence 
to which the court was privy at the time or identify new evidence that the court missed. None of 
this activity will change the court’s decision, but when similar cases come up or when the same 
case is appealed, judges attuned to these discussions will mine them for evidence about the way 
in which the court should decide now and in the future. Thus, a higher court might reverse the 
decision of a lower court or precedent might be overturned, and the justification for such 
changes to the law might well depend on the sorts of evidence uncovered through public 
discussions of past judges’ decisions. 
(d) Legal change. Finally, courts do not merely apply the law; courts interpret the law and 
even change it in a way that should be responsive to the sorts of evidence that turns up over the 
                                                 
58 In particular, Fuller points out that “In some fields of labor arbitration, […] it is the practice to 
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course of courtroom proceedings. In spite of courts’ sometime self-presentation as discoverers 
of the law, rather than as legislators, the law with which judges interact is in fact quite dynamic. 
(“[A]s we all know,” Waldron observes, “the law is changed every day in our appellate 
courts…”59) I noted that positivists like Hart and Raz might well embrace the idea that courts do 
and even should refrain from applying the law as they find it; on the positivist conception, this 
tendency to change the law just isn’t essential to their status as courts. But given the widespread 
tendency of courts to change the law, and (more importantly) Fuller’s point that courts differ 
from other norm-appliers (like umpires) in that they take as input other considerations than the 
rules and the facts of the matter, I see no reason to embrace the positivist conception of courts. 
We should take courts to be places that are paradigmatically apt to revise the law by interpreting it 
or exercising judicial discretion. 
To be sure, a number of considerations tell against allowing too much judicial discretion. 
It could make it difficult for legal subjects to predict the ways in which courts will decide even 
the simplest cases, which will undermine their capacity to know the law and to guide their 
actions by it. As Frederick Schauer observes, “it might be the case that the best legal system is 
one in which individual judges do not seek—or at least, do not always seek—to obtain the best 
all-things-considered outcome.”60 But I do not argue that judges have or should be given 
complete discretion to act on the evidence available to them each time a case comes before 
them, because too much judicial discretion would ultimately destroys the law’s capacity to learn. 
In order for change to count as learning, it must be systematic in a way that legal change could not 
be were judicial discretion utterly unconstrained. The nature of the judicial legal role will accord 
judges powers, but will also impose constraints; will accord privileges, but also duties and 
                                                 
59 Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 12. 
 
60 Frederick Schauer, “A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park,” in New York University Law 
Review 83 (2008): 1131. 
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responsibilities. Judges can be required to modify rules only in response, say, to a preponderance 
of evidence that the rule as it stands is bad. And (more importantly) judges can be required to 
modify rules only in response to certain kinds of evidence. The imposition of limits on the kinds 
of discourse acceptable within the courtroom can focus judicial discretion in a way that will 
afford the law a capacity to change, but that will also shape legal change in such a way as to 
render it interpretable not merely as chaotic change, but as learning. 
I have highlighted the features associated with the ordinary conception of courts that 
Waldron invokes, and suggested that they can be made sense of as features that render the 
institution apt for the provision of the Razian service. The roles taken on involve a host of 
powers and responsibilities. Some of these responsibilities ensure that courts will have access to 
evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects. Call these access requirements: courtroom 
standards guarantee to legal subjects that they will have the opportunity to speak; judges have a 
responsibility to organize courtroom discourse according to a set of institutionalized norms, to 
prevent legal discourse from devolving into mere rhetoric. Others ensure that courts will be 
responsive to this evidence. Call these responsiveness requirements: courtroom standards guarantee, 
not only that legal subjects will have the opportunity to speak, but also that they will be heard; 
and judges are typically required to base their decisions on the evidence available to them, to 
publish defenses of their opinions (at least, where there are no countervailing considerations), 
and to take previous judges’ opinions into account in reaching their decisions. Both access and 
responsiveness requirements follow neatly from the ordinary (non-positivist) conception of 
courts that Waldron identifies in the passage quoted above, and structure courts and the roles 
associated with them in such a way as to render courts apt for the provision of the Razian 
service. 
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This is an important part of law’s self-presentation to legal subjects, and so should be 
understood as evidence that law claims to provide the Razian service for legal subjects, 
vindicating the CLT. 
(3) The Sources Thesis 
In this sub-section, I’ll be concerned to critique Raz’s argument for legal positivism. 
First, I’ll discuss the argument for the Sources Thesis, according to which all legally valid rules 
can be identified by appeal exclusively to social facts (that is, without appeal to evaluative 
arguments). Second, I’ll argue that the Sources Thesis (as Raz understands it) does not follow 
from his argument for it. Third, I’ll show that the argument actually tells against legal positivism. 
(a) The Sources Thesis and the argument for legal positivism. Raz has argued that the Sources 
Thesis follows from CLT (understood as the thesis that law claims to provide the Razian 
service). The argument has two steps. 
First, Raz argues that an agent (or institution) cannot even claim authority over another 
unless she (or it) is capable of having it.61 Something conceptually incapable of having 
authority—say, a tree—cannot claim authority over an agent, nor can an agent free of any 
conceptual confusions about trees take a tree to be authoritative. 
Second, Raz argues that one cannot possibly provide the service unless it is possible for 
subjects to identify one’s instructions without having to work out for themselves what they have 
reason to do. Take two agents, A and S. Say that A would provide the Razian service for S, but S 
can’t determine the content of A’s instructs without working out independently what he has 
reason to do. But then S can’t outsource to A his practical reasoning; he has to do his own 
practical reasoning just to understand A’s instructions. So one agent A can’t provide the Razian 
service for another agent S unless it is possible for S to know what A instructs without 
                                                 
61 Raz, “Authority, Law, and Morality,” 301. 
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independently determining independently what he has reason to do.62 If law claims to provide 
the Razian service, and if law cannot claim to do so unless it is capable of providing the service, 
then law must provide to legal subjects instructions whose content is discoverable by legal 
subjects without their having to work out for themselves what they have reason to do. So, Raz 
argues, CLT entails that all legally valid rules “can be identified by reference to social facts alone, 
without resort to any evaluative argument.”63 This is the Sources Thesis. 
Raz invokes the Sources Thesis primarily in his critique of Dworkin’s conception of law. 
For the purposes of this paper, we’ll take the target of Raz’s argument to be the claim that, in 
order to determine what the law requires, judges must (in part) determine what the law should 
require. (A fuller discussion of the details of Dworkin’s account would lie beyond the scope of 
my project.) But, Raz argues, the content of law must be discoverable by appeal to social facts 
exclusively, that is, without appeal to evaluative arguments about what law should be. So the 
Sources Thesis is incompatible with this roughly Dworkinian conception of law. And since the 
Sources Thesis seems to follow from CLT, law’s claim to provide the Razian service seems 
incompatible with it as well. 
(Raz, in arguing against this conception of law, does not argue that judges should not be 
interested in moral considerations—after all, they are moral agents, and so moral considerations 
should guide their actions, including the actions they perform on the bench. But Raz denies that 
                                                 
62 Here’s how Raz puts the point: “Suppose that an arbitrator, asked to decide what is fair in a 
situation, has given a correct decision. That is, suppose there is only one fair outcome, and it was 
picked out by the arbitrator. Suppose that the parties to the dispute are told only that about his 
decision, i.e., that he gave the only correct decision. They will feel that they know little more of 
what the decision is than they did before. They were given a uniquely identifying description of 
the decision and yet it is an entirely unhelpful description. If they could agree on what was fair 
they would not have needed the arbitrator in the first place. A decision is serviceable only if it 
can be identified by means other than the considerations the weight and outcome of which it 
was meant to settle.” Raz, “Authority, Law, and Morality,” 304. 
 
63 Raz, “Authority, Law, and Morality,” 295-6. 
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they must appeal to moral considerations in order to determine what the law requires in the case 
at hand. When judges make appeal to, say, moral considerations in justifying their decisions, they 
look beyond the law; and when these considerations tell against applying the law as it stands, Raz 
argues that judges should change the law by exercising their lawmaking capacities.64 They do not 
appeal to evaluative arguments in order to determine what law is, what the law instructs legal 
subjects to do in the case under consideration.) 
(b) An argument against legal positivism. I argued in Section VI.2 that courts are structured in 
such a way as to make them apt for the provision of the Razian service for legal subjects, and 
that this counts as evidence in favor of CLT; since Raz argues from CLT to the Sources Thesis, 
it looks (at first glance) as though I have provided indirect evidence for the Sources Thesis (and 
so for legal positivism). But the emphasis on law’s procedural aspects for which I’ve argued 
suggests an argument that tells in the opposite direction. I suggest that, once we focus on law’s 
procedural elements, we will have to understand the Sources Thesis quite differently than Raz 
understands it when he invokes it in his argument against the Dworkinian conception of law. 
Understood as a claim about the sorts of things to which judges (simply in their capacity as 
judges speaking for the law) must make appeal in deciding particular cases, the Sources Thesis 
does not follow from Raz’s argument for it. Understood more weakly as a claim about the sorts 
of things legal subjects must look in identifying law’s past decisions, the Sources Thesis follows 
from Raz’s argument for it, but it no longer tells against a roughly Dworkinian conception of 
law. 
If law claims authority, and if law expresses this claim by imposing access and 
responsiveness requirements of the type I discussed in Section 5.2 on courtroom officials, then 
law itself—not merely judges acting as moral agents—must be responsive to evidence about the 
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reasons holding for legal subjects, just as doctors and other providers of the Razian service must 
be so responsive. Judges render law responsive to this evidence in part through exercises of their 
power to interpret law, and law imposes constraints on the range of interpretations available to 
judges: by subjecting courtroom officials to access and responsiveness requirements of the sort I 
described above, law directs judges to reach decisions that are appropriately responsive to 
evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects. That means that the range of 
interpretations available to judges in deciding any particular case will be affected by that evidence 
and the implications it has about the correctness of past decisions; and that means that as new 
evidence surfaces, the range of available interpretations will change. So the law’s content 
(understood as the way in which law directs judges to decide particular cases) will change as 
evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects changes. 
To be sure, some kind of Sources Thesis does follow from Raz’s argument for it. Just as 
patients must be able to identify doctors’ past prescriptions, so legal subjects must be able to 
identify law’s past decisions if law is to claim to provide for them the Razian service. But law’s 
current content is not fully determined by past decisions; it is determined in part by the evidence 
available about the reasons holding for legal subjects, and its implications about the correctness 
of past decisions. Law’s content will depend, that is, on the evidence that has surfaced about 
what law ought to be. To be sure, legal subjects may not be able to discover for themselves these 
implications until the law issues a new decision, but this is no different from the fact that 
patients cannot discover for themselves the implications of a new ache until they present the 
evidence to their doctor.  
So Raz’s argument for a robust Sources Thesis that tells in favor of legal positivism fails. 
Moreover, the thesis that law claims to provide for legal subjects the Razian service entails a new 
thesis that is in an important respect quite amenable to the Dworkinian conception of law: law’s 
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content is influenced by the available evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects, and 
as new evidence becomes available, the content of the law will change. CLT even becomes a 
consideration telling against legal positivism. 
(4) Law’s Claim and the Rule of Law 
Finally, we’re in a position to discover a connection between the concept of law and the 
Rule of Law. One of the more important values served by the Rule of Law is the constraint of 
arbitrary exercises of power; I’ll argue that the access and responsiveness requirements I’ve 
discussed above serve this value. And because they follow from something internal to law (its 
claim to provide for legal subjects the Razian service), they provide a clear link between the 
concept of law and the Rule of Law. 
(a) Formal requirements associated with the Rule of Law. Traditionally, the Rule of Law has 
been associated with formal requirements on legal systems: valid legal rules must be general, 
public, prospective, clear, coherent, satisfiable, relatively stable; and there must be some match 
between law as it is officially declared, and law as it is executed by legal officials. These are the 
eight desiderata associated with Fuller’s conception of law’s internal morality.65 In arguing that 
these desiderata constitute an internal morality of law, Fuller demonstrated that without them, 
legal subjects could not possibly guide their actions by legal rules. Legal subjects must know 
what the law is, have reasonable expectations about what law will be, and be capable of satisfying 
its requirements if they are to fit their actions to its demands. Only in this way will they be ruled 
in a legal fashion. 
                                                 
65 Fuller first suggested that these formal requirements constitute a morality internal to law itself 
in his half of the Fuller–Hart debate (“Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Hart,” Harvard 
University Law Review 71 (1958), esp. 644-657), and developed the argument more fully in The 
Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), esp. Ch. 2, “The Morality that Makes 
Law Possible,” 33-94. 
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Raz, in his discussion of the Rule of Law,66 offers a list of formal desiderata similar to 
Fuller’s, though it includes (in addition to those Fuller identifies) requirements that courts be 
independent and generally accessible, that they involve open and fair hearings, that they have 
review power over other aspects of the legal system; that lawmaking institutions be guided by 
open, stable, clear, and general rules; and that other law-applying institutions, like police forces 
or public prosecutors, are not free to subvert the law, say, but choosing not to arrest or 
prosecute certain classes of violations.67 
Legal systems’ satisfaction of these formal requirements serves a number of values. For 
one thing, it promotes the kind of stability that underwrites legal subjects’ capacities to plan their 
lives by making them familiar with the ways in which legal officials will interfere in it, and with 
the ways in which their peers’ actions are (and are not) constrained. This is thought to promote 
legal subjects’ freedom by giving them control over the ways their lives go. Violations of the 
Rule of Law provoke uncertainty and frustrate expectations; the latter, in particular, Raz 
identifies as an affront to human dignity, arguing that when one’s expectations are frustrated 
through a failure of the Rule of Law, “one is encouraged innocently to rely on the law and then 
that assurance is withdrawn and one’s very reliance is turned into a cause of harm to one.”68 
                                                 
66 Raz, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue,” in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), 210-229. 
 
67 Raz, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue,” 214-219. 
 
68 Raz, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue,” 222. But, Raz argues, although the violation of the 
formal requirements associated with the Rule of Law counts as an affront to human dignity, the 
satisfaction of those requirements does not prevent affronts to human dignity. The law might well 
constitute master–slave relationships through processes that conform perfectly well to the 
requirements associated with the Rule of Law. So, on this score, the Rule of Law is a negative 
virtue: it prevents (one kind of) disrespect, but does not guarantee respect. 
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Raz also identifies the Rule of Law as essential to law’s efficiency.69 If the formal 
requirements associated with the Rule of Law are not satisfied within a legal system, then in that 
system legal subjects will be unable to guide their actions by the law. But general conformity to 
the law is often a necessary condition for the achievement of the law’s purposes, and general 
conformity is not possible if subjects are unable to guide their actions by the law. So in general, 
satisfaction of the formal requirements associated with the Rule of Law are a necessary 
condition for the achievement of law’s purposes.70 
(b) Arbitrary power. But the Rule of Law is also understood as a bulwark against arbitrary 
power.71 In this vein, Postema distinguishes the Rule of Law from rule with law, that is, arbitrary 
power cloaked in law’s trappings so as to give it an air of legitimacy.72 Raz argues that there are 
certain kinds of arbitrary power that the Rule of Law (as he conceives it) cannot curb: “A ruler 
can promote general rules based on whim or self-interest, etc., without offending against the 
Rule of Law.”73 He is right that the formal requirements he and Fuller associate with the rule of 
law cannot restrain such abuses of power, but I’ll argue that by taking the lessons we have 
learned so far to heart and by applying them to legal officials generally (including, for example, 
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70 But (again—see n. 68) that doesn’t mean it is a sufficient condition. It’s a familiar phenomenon 
that general conformity may not be enough to secure law’s purposes. So on this count, too (Raz 
argues), the Rule of Law is a negative virtue. It makes possible the achievement of law’s purposes 
by making possible general conformity, but it does not guarantee it. 
 
71 Raz signs on to this idea in “The Rule of Law and its Virtue,” 219. See also Postema, “Law’s 
Ethos: Reflections on a Public Practice of Illegality,” in Boston University Law Review 90 (2010): 
1855. “…[L]aw is best thought of as… a mode of ordering and governance that takes its shape 
from its fundamental aim, which we might characterize, rather too abstractly perhaps, as that of 
constraining the exercise of arbitrary power.” 
 
72 Postema, “Positivism and the Separation of Realists from their Scepticism,” in The Hart-Fuller 
Debate in the 21st Century (2010), 275. 
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lawmaking institutions like legislatures), we can learn something about the way in which these 
very abuses might be curtailed. 
I suggest that power that is exercised in a way that is unresponsive to evidence 
concerning the way in which it should be wielded is arbitrary power; and at least some of the 
evidence to which legal officials should be responsive is evidence about the reasons holding for 
legal subjects. Power that is exercised in a way that is unresponsive to evidence about the 
reasons holding for those over whom it is wielded counts, then, as a species of arbitrary power. 
Consider some cases. When the members of particular groups manipulate legal structures to 
their own exclusive advantage, they render law unresponsive to evidence about the reasons 
holding for legal subjects generally (that is, qua legal subjects, rather than qua members of the 
manipulative groups). This looks like a fairly standard kind of arbitrary power. So do cases in 
which agents render law unresponsive to evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects 
through their own inabilities to interpret that evidence appropriately. When passions, phobias, 
and prejudices short-circuit lawmakers’, law-appliers’, and law-interpreters’ capacities to identify 
and respond to evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects, the decisions they reach 
are in an important sense arbitrary. And when legal officials wield their power in unprincipled or 
even malicious ways simply because they can do so with impunity—again, another way in which 
power is exercised arbitrarily—their decisions again do not depend on evidence about the 
reasons holding for legal subjects. 
If it is one of the virtues of the Rule of Law that it curbs arbitrary power, and if one 
species of arbitrary power is power whose exercise is unresponsive to evidence about the 
reasons holding for those over whom it is exercised, then we are in a position to understand the 
access and responsiveness requirements associated with the roles of courtroom officials as ways 
in which law restrains arbitrary power; after all, such requirements are supposed to render legal 
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officials responsive to precisely this evidence. In structuring courts in a way that renders them 
apt for the provision of the Razian service, law does not merely express its claim to legitimacy; it 
establishes constraints on the ways in which courtroom officials can exercise their power. So 
these requirements are well understood, not merely as expressive of law’s claim to provide for 
legal subjects the Razian service, but also as Rule of Law requirements. So we’ve identified an 
important connection between the concept of law and the Rule of Law. 
VII. Legal Procedures: A Summing Up 
By taking seriously the processes associated with the provision of the Razian service, we 
have learned three important lessons about law. First, we have vindicated Raz’s claimed 
legitimacy thesis by understanding the access and responsiveness requirements associated with 
courts as important aspects of law’s self-presentation. Second, we have seen that—pace Raz—the 
claimed legitimacy thesis does not entail legal positivism—in fact, it shows that law’s content is 
importantly influenced by changing evidence about the reasons holding for legal subjects. And 
third, we have discovered an important aspect of the Rule of Law left out of the formal 
requirements articulated by Fuller and Raz, namely, the access and responsiveness requirements 
associated with courts. These are considerable lessons, and we can discover them simply by 
noticing that Razian authority does not simply involve the issuing of substantively correct 
directives; it involves processes that are open to and appropriately responsive to evidence about 
the reasons holding for subjects, processes that aim at bringing subjects’ acts into conformity 
with the reasons holding for legal subjects. 
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